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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
BRET THOMAS CRIDDLE, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 950639-CA 
Priority No. 2 (incarcerated) 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-a-3(2)(f) provides this Court's 
jurisdiction over this criminal case involving a second degree 
felony. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Does the trial court's failure to recuse himself, or 
trial counsels' or the prosecutor's failure to move for the 
recusal of the trial court require a new trial? 
Since this issue was not raised below, this Court must apply 
standards set forth in State v. Neeley, 748 P.2d 1091(Utah), 
cert, denied, 487 U.S. 1220 (1988), and determine whether Utah 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 2 9 was complied with, whether there is 
a showing of actual prejudice, and whether there was an abuse of 
discretion. The Court may resort to the ineffective assistance of 
counsel and/or plain error doctrines in addressing the merits of 
this issue. 
2. Does Mr. Criddle's incompetency at the time he stood 
trial require a new trial? 
Since this issue was not raised below, this Court must 
determine whether evidence of Mr. Criddle's incompetency arose 
during the proceedings, requiring the trial court to initiate 
competency proceedings. See State v. Young, 780 P.2d 1233, 1235-
38 (Utah 1989). See also Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-2. This Court 
may resort to the ineffective assistance of counsel and/or plain 
error doctrines in addressing the merits of this issue. 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following statutes, rules and constitutional provisions 
are central to this appeal, and are copied in full in Appendix 1 
to this brief: 
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 7 
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 12 
United States Constitution, Amendment VI 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, section 1 
Utah Code Ann. section 77-15-1 
Utah Code Ann. section 77-15-2 
Utah Code Ann. section 77-15-3 
Utah Code Ann. section 77-15-4 
Utah Code Ann. section 77-15-5 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 23 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 29. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE 
The State charged Mr. Criddle and two co-defendants with one 
count of theft, a second degree felony (R. 7-10). The magistrate 
appointed Mr. Robert L. Steele of the Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Association to represent Mr. Criddle (R. 2), and the magistrate 
granted Mr. Criddle's motion to sever the case from the co-
defendants' and reduced the bond to $2,500 prior to the 
preliminary hearing (R. 3). After the preliminary hearing on May 
31, 1994, the magistrate bound over Mr. Criddle as charged to 
2 
district court (R. 1). 
Jury trial commenced and completed on March 20, 1995, in 
Judge Brian's court (R. 163). The trial court denied trial 
counsel's motion for a directed verdict, finding sufficient 
evidence of Mr. Criddle's intent to deprive, and that the value 
of the property at issue was established sufficiently (R. 341-
347). The jury convicted Mr. Criddle as he was charged (R. 167). 
Mr. Steele withdrew from representing Mr. Criddle because a 
conflict arose, and Joseph Fratto Jr. represented Mr. Criddle at 
sentencing, where Judge Brian sentenced Mr. Criddle to prison for 
one to fifteen years (R. 388). Subsequently, Mr. Fratto withdrew 
from representing Mr. Criddle, and the trial court appointed 
Candice A. Johnson to represent Mr. Criddle on appeal (R. 2 07). 
FACTS OF THE CASE 
On April 22, 1994, Stephen Howe discovered that his trailer 
full of tools worth over $15,000, which was parked in the parking 
lot of an apartment complex at 4045 South Clubhouse Drive in Salt 
Lake County, was missing (R. 299-304). For months prior to this, 
the trailer bore some stickers placed there by a security company 
indicating that if the trailer was not removed from its location, 
it would be towed (R. 305-306). Upon discovering the trailer 
missing, Mr. Howe checked with the apartment complex management, 
with his neighbors, with a towing company, and finally with the 
police (R. 306-307). When he next saw his trailer it was after 
the police recovered it. It was damaged and the contents were in 
disarray and missing (R. 309). 
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Mr. Howe knew that Mr. Criddle lived in the same apartment 
complex as Mr. Howe at the time that the trailer disappeared (R. 
310). Mr. Howe did not give Mr. Criddle or anyone else 
permission to be in or take the trailer (R. 311). 
After the theft of the trailer, Mr. Criddle approached Mr. 
Howe a couple of times and tried to tell Mr. Howe that Mr. 
Criddle was not directly involved in the theft of the trailer, 
but was present when the theft occurred (R. 316-317). Mr. Howe 
was angry and did not listen to exactly what Mr. Criddle was 
saying (R. 317) . 
On April 22, 1995, Ronald Johnson, a Murray City Police 
Officer, was responding in uniform and a marked police car to the 
Midas Muffler shop located at 4500 South State Street (R. 318). 
The dispatch operator informed him that the truck pulling Mr. 
Howe's trailer had been spotted, and he began heading toward the 
location of the truck and trailer, following directions given by 
people on the street (R. 319). He followed a path of gouges in 
the asphalt (apparently from the dragging trailer jack), and 
eventually found the trailer, which was parked on the roadside 
after hitting a telephone pole (R. 320). 
Officer Johnson got out and approached three people "milling 
around" near the trailer, one of whom was Mr. Criddle (R. 32 0-
321). The three people initially headed toward the truck when 
they saw Officer Johnson, but after he ordered them to stop 
twice, and before they got in the truck, all three of them 
stopped (R. 322). A Mr. Remington was apparently the driver of 
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the truck and a Mr. Brollier was the other passenger (R. 326). 
Detective Ben Jones talked to Mr. Criddle at the Murray 
Police Station on April 22, 1995, after he informed Mr. Criddle 
of his Miranda rights, and Mr. Criddle agreed to speak with him 
(R. 328-330) . Detective Jones' testimony regarding their 
conversation was as follows: 
He indicated to me that he and two of his friends 
had been drinking all day long, and had talked about 
taking the trailer, that they didn't really think they 
were going to do it right at that moment, but as they 
drove by it, one of the friends said, To hell with it, 
and they backed up to the trailer and hooked the 
trailer to a vehicle. 
Mr. Criddle said, actually, all three of them got 
out. He didn't physically help them hook it up. There 
were three of them. Two of them grabbed it and hooked 
it on, and they jumped back in the vehicle, and took 
off with it. 
He indicated to me he was sitting in the center of 
the pickup truck. 
He did say all three of them got out of the 
vehicle, but he did not physically help them hook the 
trailer up. 
(R. 331). 
Without specifying particular persons, Detective Jones 
testified that they intended to take the contents of a trailer to 
sell to a pawnshop (R. 331), that they stopped at Midas Muffler 
to get a lock cut off the trailer and sold one of the tools to 
someone, that as they drove off, the trailer detached, and that 
as they had just returned to retrieve the trailer, Officer 
Johnson arrived (R. 332). 
He testified that Mr. Criddle understood that the trailer 
was stolen, but "thought it would be all right" because he 
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thought the trailer had been abandoned (R. 333-334) . Detective 
Jones recalled Mr. Criddle having used the word "steal" during 
the course of their interview, but that portion of the interview 
did not tape record (R. 336). Mr. Criddle never admitted to 
having stolen the trailer himself (R. 337). 
In discussing the plans to take the trailer, Mr. Criddle 
told Detective Jones that his plan was to speak with the manager 
of the apartment complex to make sure that the trailer was 
abandoned (R. 337). But when he and Remington and Brollier 
drove past the trailer, Remington said, "Hell with it," and 
Remington and Brollier hooked on the trailer to Remington's truck 
(R. 337). It was Remington who lied to the employee at the Midas 
Muffler shop, indicating that the trailer belonged to someone's 
ex-wife (R. 339). Mr. Criddle apparently told Detective Jones 
that Remington, Brollier and Criddle were making up stories at 
the muffler shop to get the employees to cut off the lock from 
the trailer (R. 340). 
Mr. Criddle told Detective Jones that the entire incident 
was beyond his control (R. 338), and that he wanted to just walk 
away but felt too involved to do so (R. 340). The idea about 
pawning the contents of the trailer was one discussed prior to 
their taking the trailer, when Mr. Criddle was intent on speaking 
to the manager of the apartment complex to make sure that the 
trailer had been abandoned (R. 339). 
Detective Jones interviewed Mr. Criddle fifteen minutes 
after Mr. Criddle's arrest (R. 335). He agreed that Mr. Criddle 
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was "very intoxicated." (R. 335). Detective Jones took no notes, 
but tape recorded this conversation, but parts of the tape were 
inaudible (R. 333). 
Detective Jones also interviewed the other two suspects, who 
had also been drinking (R. 336). Mr. Criddle was the most 
cooperative (R. 336). Mr. Brollier told Detective Jones the same 
thing that Mr. Criddle did, while Mr. Remington was uncooperative 
(R. 336). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should reverse Mr. Criddle's conviction and order 
a new trial because the record demonstrates that the trial court 
was actually biased against Mr. Criddle, because the trial court 
abused his discretion in presiding over the case given this bias, 
and because the court and parties did not comply with Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 29. 
Mr. Criddle's conviction must also be reversed because Mr. 
Criddle was incompetent to stand trial. Evidence of his 
incompetency clearly arose prior to trial, and prior to 
sentencing, yet the trial court failed to afford Mr. Criddle due 
process of law by holding competency proceedings. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE FAILURE OF THE TRIAL COURT TO RECUSE HIMSELF, OR OF 
TRIAL COUNSEL OR THE PROSECUTOR TO MOVE TO RECUSE THE JUDGE 
REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL. 
A. THE FACTS DEMONSTRATE ACTUAL BIAS ON THE PART OF THE 
TRIAL COURT. 
Prior to and after trial, Mr. Criddle made gestures and 
written statements which the trial court interpreted as 
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threatening the trial court on four separate occasions (R. 34, 
375-376). 
The first such incident apparently occurred in open court. 
At the district court arraignment on June 10, 1994, Mr. Criddle 
pled not guilty, and Judge Brian scheduled a pretrial conference 
on July 22, 1994, and a jury trial on August 1, 1994 (R. 20). 
Mr. Criddle did not appear at the pretrial conference, so Judge 
Brian issued a no-bail bench warrant and struck the trial date 
(R. 25). A sheriff's deputy arrested Mr. Criddle on the bench 
warrant on January 20, 1994 (R. 29). At the bench warrant 
hearing on February 3, 1995, Judge Brian set a jury trial date of 
March 20, 1995, and ordered Mr. Criddle held in the jail pending 
the trial (R. 31). Mr. Criddle explained to the judge that he 
had come to court at the wrong time on the date scheduled and 
spoken with the Judge's clerk (R. 239). When Judge Brian 
indicated that he would not consider setting a bail, Mr. Criddle 
stated, "That's a mistake, your Honor." (R. 240). 
The district court file contains a written statement dated 
February 3, 1995, by Diane Malmborg, District Agent for Adult 
Probation and Parole, which states, 
On February 3, 1994 at approximately 1435 hours 
before Judge Brian's Court for the Criminal Calendar, 
defendant Bret Criddle turned to the audience and made 
hand signals to a middle aged female later identified 
as the defendant's mother. The hand signals were made 
with the defendant's right hand. The index finger was 
pointing straight with his thumb on top & the three 
remaining fingers rolled toward the palm of his hand. 
It appeared to simulate a gun shooting. The defendant 
the pointed to his head and then to Judge Brian. It 
appeared to be a threat that he wanted to shoot the 
judge in the head. This agent leaned to the middle 
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aged female and asked "What does that mean," but she 
ignored the inquiry. 
(R. 32) . 
A minute entry dated February 7, 1995 provides, 
THE DEFENDANT THREATENED JUDGE BRIAN'S LIFE ON FEBRUARY 
3, 1995. BASED ON THAT AND THAT DEFENDANT WAS GIVEN A 
C.D.R. RELEASE, THE COURT ORDERS THAT A NO-BAIL BENCH 
WARRANT BE ISSUED FOR THE DEFENDANT'S ARREST, 
RETURNABLE FORTHWITH. 
(R. 34). 
The three letters that the court considered threats on the 
court's life (T. 375-376) are difficult to identify, inasmuch as 
the record contains four letters from Mr. Criddle prior to the 
court's statement that Mr. Criddle had written three letters 
threatening the court's life. The first letter accompanied Mr. 
Steele's motion for Mr. Criddle's release from the jail after Mr. 
Criddle was arrested on the bench warrant, and stated, 
DEAR JUDGE BRIAN, 
I LIKE TO APOLOGIZE FOR MY IRRATIONALITY IN COURT 
FRIDAY THE THIRD. I HAVE A POSITIVE ATTITUDE ABOUT 
COMING BEFORE YOU AS I AM CONFIDENT OF MY INNOCENCE TO 
THE OFFENSE I HAVE BEEN CHARGED WITH. WHEN I ENTERED 
YOUR COURT ROOM I WAS OVERWHELMED WITH AN IMMENSE 
TENSION I COULDN'T EXPLAIN AND I LOST MY COMPOSURE 
ALMOST COMPLETELY PLEASE ACCEPT MY SINCERE APOLOGIES 
FOR ANYTHING GESTURED AND OR SAID BY TIME THAT MAY HAVE 
SEEMED TO BE ANYTHING BUT A PLEA TO BE HEARD IN 
IMPARTIALITY. THANK YOU SINCERELY BRET CRIDDLE 
(R. 40). 
The second letter in the district court file was also 
apparently written prior to the hearing on Mr. Steele's motion 
for Mr. Criddle's release, and has two district court date 
stamps: one indicating that the letter was filed on March 10, 
1995, and one indicating that it was filed March 6, 1995 (R. 57). 
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The letter provides, 
Dear Judge Brian, 
I am a good person and I am generally right. I am 
not a threatening person nor am I assaultive. I do 
however try to stand up for myself in any situation 
when I am threatened and or assaulted. 
I value my freedom "more important that my own 
life." 
I have made an honest mistake in dealing with your 
court. I appeared at two o'clock P.M. rather than ten 
o'clock A.M.. I reported to your clerk and was told 
that I would be given a new trial date and time because 
I had made contact with your court within twenty four 
hours of my originally scheduled date and time. I 
expected notification of the new date and time to be 
sent to me because it is my case and my life at stake. 
I didn't receive notification and I did not become 
concerned because I have been told by many people that 
the court calendar is back logged for months and that 
my trial would be quite "some" time in the future. 
My Public Defender has told me that he has 
petitioned the court to have me released until my next 
trial date, which would give me time to work and 
continue my endeavor to remain publicly visible in 
order to maintain my legitimacy as a resident of my 
neighborhood and the Salt Lake City area so I may 
travel to and fro freely and unmolested. 
An apology from myself was also submitted with my 
Public Defender's petition to the court, on my behalf. 
Let me again apologize for anything said or done on my 
part that was irrational. I felt overwhelmed with 
stress and threatened the moment I was brought before 
you. I became frustrated and lost the positive 
attitude I maintain in the majority of all of my 
dealings. 
It is hard to establish residency in a new area. 
Especially for a young single male. 
I broke my foot badly the first week of December 
and was away from my apartment for several weeks. More 
time away does no good. 
Although I still experience discomfort from my 
foot, I have been told that it may be a year or more 
before I am completely free of pain, I do believe a can 
continue working for reasonable personal gain. 
Continued confinement will do no good. 
Please, I beg you, in the interest of good, 
seriously consider the option to allow me to be 
released until my trial March 20th. Furthermore let me 
assure you, in the event of my release, I in no way 
intend to evade or avoid trial or the court system. In 
honest faith and trust, Sincerely, Bret Criddle. 
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(R. 57-58) . 
The next letter from Mr. Criddle was apparently filed after 
the trial court denied Mr. Criddle's release from the jail. It 
states, 
Dear Judge Brian, 
I don't know what reasons or rationale made you 
decide to continue to hold me but please, I beg of you, 
consider the preceding to be completely true and please 
consider it seriously. 
A friend (we will refer as One (1)) and myself 
inspected a medium size trailer that was parked in the 
parking lot of the apartment complex where, at the 
time, I had resided at for close to two and a half 
years. Upon One's (1) suggestion we inspected and 
found that the trailer had been tagged at least five 
times with a sticker of the same type stating that the 
vehicle was improperly parked and it would be towed at 
the owners expense. The license plate had expired eight 
months previously. One (1) asked how long it had ben 
parked there. I told him I didn't know. Then he asked 
if it could have possibly been there all winter. I 
told him it was possible. (It was in an area that I 
frequently pass by and It didn't seem to be a new 
addition). 
We returned to my apartment where One (1), myself, 
and a friend of mine who had been staying at my place 
had a few drinks. During the course of the afternoon 
One (1) and myself had quite a discussion about taking 
this trailer. He wanted to just go ahead and take it. 
I told him that we would wait until the following day 
when I could ask the staff of the apartment complex if 
the trailer was owned or abandoned and if it would be 
acceptable to obtain it. That evening my friend who 
had been staying with me suggested that we go out and 
get a drink. On the way out of the apartment complex 
One(l) stopped and locked his truck up to the trailer 
jumped out and chained it to his bumper. In and 
throughout the entirety of the time I was with One (1), 
he made me his company. I felt and believed that I had 
been rendered almost completely incapable. Although it 
is something that has happened to me before I could not 
remove myself from the situation. One(l) was loud and 
borderline threatening and abusive to me. He was pushy 
and vague about his intentions. I lacked the mental 
clarity to get away. Because of contact with him 
previously I wasn't seriously seeking any further 
association with him in the future. He wilfully 
involved anyway. To conclude I did not commit a crime 
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nor was I certain a crime was being committed. I was 
incapable of leaving the situation for reasons I 
couldn't comprehend at the time. I would like the 
charge against me to be dismissed. I have waited too 
long to explain the situation. Sincerely, but 
exhausted, Bret Criddle 
(R. 59-60) . 
The fourth and final letter written by Mr. Criddle prior to 
the trial court's reference to three letters written by Mr. 
Criddle's threatening the judge's life is dated July 28, 1995, 
which states, 
DEAR PAT, 
BIG PROBLEM. I DIDN'T COMMIT A CRIME. (ON ANY 
SIDE). YOU CAN'T POSSIBLY TRY TO CONTINUE DOING THE 
WRONG THING OVER & OVER AGAIN. RIGHT IN FRONT OF ME. 
YOU KNOW I DIDN'T COMMIT A CRIME AND I KNOW YOU KNOW 
THAT. YOU ALSO KNOW THERE IS NO GOOD REASON IN THE 
WORLD TO TAKE MY FREEDOM AWAY. I AM GOING TO HURT, 
MOST PROBABLY, FOR THE REST OF MY EXISTENCE BECAUSE OF 
WHAT HAS ALREADY HAPPENED. I'VE BEEN AN UNREASONABLY 
GOOD SPORT ABOUT THIS WHOLE THING. IT'S WRONG AND IF 
IT CONTINUES IT ONLY MAKES IT WORSE. 
I AM A VERY GOOD, CONTRIBUTIVE, HUMAN BEING AND 
MEMBER OF HUMANITY. A MAJORITY OF PEOPLE CAN NOT GET 
AWAY WITH HARMING ONE LIKE ME (OR ME) WITHOUT 
IRREVOCABLE REPERCUSSIONS. IT'S TIME WE "ALL" MAKE IT 
BETTER AND REMEDY THIS SITUATION. IT WAS NOT OKAY TO 
LOCK ME UP TO BEGIN WITH AND YOU KNOW IT. YOU SIMPLY 
MUST MAKE THE MATTER AS RIGHT AS YOU POSSIBLY CAN 
IMMEDIATELY. IT'S GONE WAY TOO FAR. 
OUR UNIVERSE - GOOD FOR GOOD BAD FOR BAD. I'M 
GOOD AND SO FAR YOU'VE MADE IT BAD FOR ME. 
NO EXCUSES. NO WAY. YOU JUST MAKE IT AS RIGHT AS 
YOU CAN AND WE CAN ALL WALK. 
SINCERELY, BRET CRIDDLE 
(R. 174) . 
While three of these four letters appear to be entirely 
benign, the record is clear that Judge Brian felt threatened by 
three of the letters. On August 11, 1995, the trial court 
continued sentencing on the request of trial counsel so that new 
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counsel could be appointed (R. 175). At this hearing, Mr. 
Criddle stated his wish to go free immediately, but Judge Brian 
set the case over for sentencing on September 1, 1995 (R. 375). 
Judge Brian addressed Mr. Criddle, 
The Court is going to inform you this morning, Mr. 
Criddle, that every time you send a letter threatening 
my life, I am going to send it back to the Board of 
Pardons, and I am going to recommend that they keep you 
for the maximum period provided by law. This is the 
third letter that you have sent to me threatening my 
life. You threatened my life once in open court. 
(R. 375-376) . When Mr. Criddle denied this, Judge Brian 
continued, 
Just a minute. Every letter that you send to me, I am 
sending it back in a package to the Board of Pardons, 
and I am going to recommend that they keep you every 
day that is provided by law. You will be an old man 
when you get out of the State Prison. If you have a 
certain amount of fun and frolic out of threatening my 
life, you just have at it, because every one of these 
letters are going to stare you in the face when you 
appear before the Board of Pardons. 
All right. Get him out of here. 
(R. 376). 
Apparently after Mr. Criddle was taken out of the courtroom, 
Judge Brian also indicated his intention to send a copy of Mr. 
Criddle's letter to Judge Stirba, who was to sentence Mr. Criddle 
on August 28, 1995 (R. 377). The judge then added, 
I might tell you right up front, so there is no 
question about this, this case is going to go back to 
back to whatever sentence he gets in another court. I 
have had it with this guy. I don't take lightly his 
threats. He threatened me in court, and this is the 
third time by letter. I am going to sock him away as 
long as the law provides. 
(R. 377). The judge then again indicated his intention to send a 
copy of Mr. Criddle's letter to Judge Stirba, and to write to the 
13 
board of pardons "to tell them exactly what we're dealing with." 
(R. 3 78). Then there was a bench conference between trial 
counsel, the prosecutor, and the court (R. 3 78). 
The district court file contains a letter dated October 12, 
1995, from Judge Brian to the Board of Pardons stating, 
Dear Board Members, 
Enclosed please find copies of several letters written 
by Bret Thomas Criddle during the past several months. 
Also, a statement by an agent of Adult Probation and 
Parole is enclosed. 
I am somewhat fearful of this man. Please notify me of 
his release date. 
Best wishes to each of you. 
Sincerely, 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
Third Judicial District Court 
(R. 217). 
Neither trial counsel nor the prosecutor filed a motion to 
recuse the judge, and the judge did not recuse himself. 
B. THE LAW REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE JUDGE BRIAN SHOULD 
HAVE RECUSED HIMSELF. 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 2 9 governs recusal of 
judges, and provides, 
(a) If, by reason of death, sickness, or other 
disability, the judge before whom a trial has begun is 
unable to continue with the trial, any other judge of 
that court or any judge assigned by the presiding 
officer of the Judicial Council, upon certifying that 
he has familiarized himself with the record of the 
trial, may, unless otherwise disqualified, proceed with 
and finish the trial, but if the assigned judge is 
satisfied that neither he nor another substitute judge 
can proceed with the trial, he may, in his discretion, 
grant a new trial. 
(b) If, by reason of death, sickness, or other 
disability, the judge before whom a defendant has been 
tried is unable to perform the duties required of the 
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court after a verdict of guilty, any other judge of 
that court or any judge assigned by the presiding 
officer of the Judicial Council may perform those 
duties. 
(c) If the prosecution or a defendant in any 
criminal action or proceeding files an affidavit that 
the judge before whom the action or proceeding is to be 
tried or heard has a bias or prejudice, either against 
the party or his attorney or in favor of any opposing 
party to the suit, the judge shall proceed no further 
until the challenge is disposed of. Every affidavit 
shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief 
that the bias or prejudice exists and shall be filed as 
soon as practicable after the case has been assigned or 
the bias or prejudice is known. No affidavit may be 
filed unless accompanied by a certificate of counsel of 
record that the affidavit and application are made in 
good faith. 
(d) If the challenged judge questions the 
sufficiency of the allegation of disqualification, he 
shall enter an order directing that a copy be forthwith 
certified to another named judge of the same court or 
of a court of like jurisdiction, which judge shall then 
pass upon the legal sufficiency of the allegations. If 
the challenged judge does not question the legal 
sufficiency of the affidavit, or if the judge to whom 
the affidavit is certified finds that it is legally 
sufficient, another judge shall be called to try the 
case or to conduct the proceeding. If the judge to whom 
the affidavit is certified does not find the affidavit 
to be legally sufficient, he shall enter a finding to 
that effect and the challenged judge shall proceed with 
the case or proceeding. 
(e) (I) If the prosecution or a defendant in a 
criminal action believes that a fair and impartial 
trial cannot be had in the jurisdiction where the 
action is pending, either may, by motion, supported by 
an affidavit setting forth facts, ask to have the trial 
of the case transferred to another jurisdiction. 
(ii) If the court is satisfied that the 
representations made in the affidavit are true and 
justify transfer of the case, the court shall enter an 
order for the removal of the case to the court of 
another jurisdiction free from the objection and all 
records pertaining to the case shall be transferred 
forthwith to the court in the other county. If the 
court is not satisfied that the representations so made 
justify transfer of the case, the court shall either 
enter an order denying the transfer or order a formal 
hearing in court to resolve the matter and receive 
further evidence with respect to the alleged prejudice. 
(f) When a change of judge or place of trial is 
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ordered all documents of record concerning the case 
shall be transferred without delay to the judge who 
shall hear the case. 
Under well established Utah law, a trial judge has a duty to 
recuse himself if his impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned, even in cases where no actual bias is shown. State 
v. Neeley, 748 P.2d 1091, 10993-95(Utah), cert, denied, 487 U.S. 
1220 (1988); State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902, 911 (Utah App.), cert. 
denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990); State v. Humphrey, 793 P.2d 
918, 925-26 (Utah App. 1990). Under this law, reversal is 
required if Rule 29 is not complied with, if there is a showing 
of an abuse of discretion, or a showing of actual bias. Id. 
A judge is biased if he has ua hostile feeling or spirit of 
ill will toward one of the litigants, or undue friendship or 
favoritism toward one/' or has "some active personal hostility 
toward the defendant." Haslam v. Morrison, 190 P.2d 520, 523 
(Utah 1948)(citations omitted). See also Black's Law 
Dictionary,("Actual bias consists in the existence of a state of 
mind on the part of the juror which satisfies the court, in the 
exercise of a sound discretion, that the juror cannot try the 
issues impartially and without prejudice to the substantial 
rights of the party challenging."). 
In the instant case, Judge Brian was actually biased against 
Mr. Criddle. Regardless of whether Mr. Criddle's action and 
statements were properly interpreted as threats on the court's 
life, the fact that Judge Brian felt personally threatened by Mr. 
Criddle demonstrates actual bias. The minute entry stating that 
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Mr. Criddle threatened the court's life and issuing a bench 
warrant prior to trial demonstrates actual bias (R. 34). The 
fact that Judge Brian, prior to conducting a sentencing hearing, 
wherein the court was to impartially weigh all pertinent evidence 
prior to sentencing Mr. Criddle, promised in open court to do 
virtually everything in his power in Judge Brian's court, in 
Judge Stirba's court, and with the board of pardons, to see to it 
that Mr. Criddle did maximum time (R. 375-378), demonstrates that 
the judge was not functioning with the requisite impartiality. 
Under rule 2 9 and Utah case law, Judge Brian should have 
recused himself because he was actually biased, and his failure 
to do so constitutes an abuse of discretion and reversible error. 
See e.g. Neeley; Haslam, supra. Compare Kleinert v. Kimball 
Elevator Co., 905 P.2d 297 (Utah App. 1995)(declining to address 
recusal issue raised for first time on appeal), with Regional 
Sales Agency v. Reichert, 830 P.2d 252 (Utah 1992)(majority 
indicates that recusal is trial court's responsibility, not 
counsel's). 
In the event that this Court does not reverse this case on 
the basis of Judge Brian's failure to recuse himself, this Court 
should reverse the case on the basis of the prosecutor's and 
trial counsel's failure to move to recuse the judge. As officers 
of the court empowered to move to recuse the trial court, the 
prosecutor and trial counsel should have moved to recuse the 
judge, who was obviously not operating with the requisite degree 
of impartiality. See Utah R.Crim.Pr. 29. 
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While trial counsel did not raise the judge's partiality, 
the plain error doctrines and ineffective assistance of counsel 
doctrines provide a means of addressing the error on appeal. 
See e.g. State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989)(discussing 
showings which must be made under plain error and ineffective 
assistance of counsel doctrines). Given Judge Brian's obvious 
hostility toward Mr. Criddle, the need for Judge Brian's recusal 
should have been obvious to the court and counsel. Given the 
relative weakness of the State's case against Mr. Criddle, the 
relatively non-serious nature of the facts proved against Mr. 
Criddle, and the fact that the sentencing matrix in Mr. Criddle's 
case recommended probation,1 there is a reasonable probability 
that the results in this case, both the verdict and ultimate 
sentence, would have been different had Judge Brian recused 
himself.2 
The presentence investigator departed from the matrix in 
recommending probation on the basis of two aggravating factors 
listed on the ''Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances" sheet 
appended to the presentence report -- ul. Established instances 
of repetitive criminal conduct," and "6. There were multiple ... 
victims." 
These factors were improper. Mr. Criddle's criminal history 
was already accounted for in the calculation of Mr. Criddle's 
criminal history score underlying his placement on the matrix, 
and thus should not have been used as a basis for departure from 
the matrix. See "Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances" 
sheet, indicating, "Only use aggravating circumstances if they 
are not implicit in the conviction offense or the calculation of 
criminal history score." 
The trial of this case demonstrates that there was only one 
victim. 
2
 In addressing this error, this Court should presume that Mr. 
Criddle was prejudiced by the trial court's partiality. See e.g. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691-692 (1984)(explaining 
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II. A NEW TRIAL IS REQUIRED BECAUSE MR. CRIDDLE WAS TRIED 
WHILE HE WAS INCOMPETENT. 
A. THE LAW FORBIDS THE TRIAL OF INCOMPETENT PEOPLE. 
Due process of law forbids the trial of an incompetent 
defendant, and requires trial courts to hold competency 
proceedings if evidence of incompetence arises during the course 
of proceedings. E.g. State v. Young, 780 P.2d 1233, 1235-38 
(Utah 1989). See also Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-1(wNo person who is 
incompetent to proceed shall be tried or punished for a public 
offense."). 
Incompetency is defined by Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-2, which 
provides, 
For the purposes of this chapter, a person is 
incompetent to proceed if he is suffering from a mental 
disorder or mental retardation resulting either in: 
(1) his inability to have a rational and factual 
understanding of the proceedings against him or of the 
punishment specified for the offense charged; or 
(2) his inability to consult with his counsel and 
to participate in the proceedings against him with a 
reasonable degree of rational understanding. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-5 further illuminates factors to be 
considered in the competency equation. It sets forth criteria 
for competency examiners to consider and address in reporting to 
the courts in competency proceedings, stating, 
circumstances in which prejudice may be presumed). This is so 
because the judge's partiality constitutes a fundamental flaw in 
the process, which virtually negated Mr. Criddle's right to 
effective assistance of counsel, because it is difficult to 
measure the exact effect that the judge's partiality may have had 
on the proceedings, because the trial court was bound by rule and 
case law to prevent the error, and because the prosecutor could 
easily have avoided the error by following rule 29. See id. 
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(4) The experts shall in the conduct of their 
examination and in their report to the court consider 
and address, in addition to any other factors 
determined to be relevant by the experts: 
(a) the defendant's present capacity to: 
(I) comprehend and appreciate the 
charges or allegations against him; 
(ii) disclose to counsel pertinent 
facts, events, and states of mind; 
(iii) comprehend and appreciate the 
range and nature of possible penalties, if 
applicable, that may be imposed in the 
proceedings against him; 
(iv) engage in reasoned choice of legal 
strategies and options; 
(v) understand the adversary nature of 
the proceedings against him; 
(vi) manifest appropriate courtroom 
behavior; and 
(vii) testify relevantly, if applicable; 
(b) the impact of the mental disorder, or 
mental retardation, if any, on the nature and 
quality of the defendant's relationship with 
counsel; 
(c) if psychoactive medication is currently 
being administered: 
(I) whether the medication is necessary 
to maintain the defendant's competency; and 
(ii) the effect of the medication, if 
any, on the defendant's demeanor and affect 
and ability to participate in the 
proceedings. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-3 allows for the filing of competency 
petitions by the defendant, by anyone representing the defendant, 
by anyone having custody of or supervision over the defendant, or 
by the prosecutors. Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-4 allows a trial 
court to raise the issue of competency at any time. 
B. THE RECORD DEMONSTRATES THAT MR. CRIDDLE WAS 
INCOMPETENT. 
Mr. Criddle's conduct in court, his progression of letters 
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to the judge and other judicial and political figures, and the 
psychological evaluation in Mr. Criddle's 90 day diagnostic 
report demonstrate that Mr. Criddle should not have been tried 
because he was incompetent. As discussed below, his paranoid 
schizotypal mental disorder left him unable to rationally 
understand the most fundamental rudiments of the criminal 
process, to make rational choices, or to conduct himself 
appropriately in the courtroom. 
1. Mr. Criddle's Behavior In Court Demonstrates His 
Incompetency. 
Mr. Criddle's behavior in court was extremely bizarre and 
demonstrated that he did not have a rational understanding of the 
proceedings against him and did not have the ability to 
participate in the proceedings in a rational manner. 
As previously noted, at the time that Judge Brian initially 
incarcerated Mr. Criddle on the bench warrant, Mr. Criddle was 
apparently making gestures to someone in the audience having to 
do with shooting himself or the judge in the head (R. 32). 
On May 5, 1995, after the trial and prior to sentencing, Mr. 
Criddle appeared in court for a sentencing hearing, which was 
continued. Prior to the hearing, Mr. Criddle had been released 
from the jail on a consent decree release and Judge Brian was 
considering incarcerating Mr. Criddle. After the prosecutor 
spoke in favor of incarcerating Mr. Criddle, Judge Brian said he 
would take Mr. Criddle into custody, and Mr. Criddle responded, 
"That's bullshit." When the judge ordered him taken into 
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custody, Mr. Criddle stated, 
I know that for a fact, because no one can be a worse 
enemy to me, because I am good. Look, you got me. You 
know it. I am not trying to get away. 
When Judge Brian began to interrupt, Mr. Criddle continued, 
But you didn't get me. You weren't good enough. 
(T. 5/5/95 at 6). Events then continued, 
MR. JONES [the prosecutor]: That's right, we 
didn't have to fool around with you. 
THE DEFENDANT: You didn't, mother fucker. 
MR. JONES: Keep it up, Bret. Keep it up. 
THE DEFENDANT: Shoot him. I didn't fucking do it. 
You know it. You know it for a fact. 
(T. 5/5/95 at 6). 
At the time of sentencing, Mr. Criddle spoke on his own 
behalf, stating 
First, I have always believed in the judicial system of 
America, and I believe that it is fair. I have never 
bought into the idea that judges, public defenders, 
county prosecutors, people that work for the State are 
unethical, meaning that they would willingly put 
someone away for a reason that doesn't warrant it, for 
a crime they did not commit, or they would not put 
someone away that is not a threat to society, not a 
threat to other people or themselves. 
I did not commit any crime during this event, and 
I believe your Honor knows that, also. And I don't 
think it would be worth it to me to exist any longer in 
a country that would go ahead and kill my innocence, 
shatter all of my beliefs, that I have believed in all 
my life. I have been a civil, nonviolent person to 
everyone I have ever had dealings with, with the 
exception of grade school and junior high, where I had 
a couple of fistfights with my peers. When I say a 
couple, I mean only two. 
I have never endeavored to harm other people. I 
have never blamed others for my problems. I always 
dealt with them myself. I don't believe that it would 
be fair or it would be just for any human being to 
sentence me to doing even one more day of any variety 
of confinement in any correctional facility or like 
facility. 
Thank you. 
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(R. 386). 
As Judge Brian began pronouncing sentence, Mr. Criddle 
interrupted him, and Judge Brian threatened to put a gag on him 
(R. 8). Mr. Criddle responded, "You are lying and you know it, 
Pat." (R. 8). Judge Brian sentenced Mr. Criddle to prison and 
said, "Get him out of here," and Mr. Criddle stated, "You should 
be going to prison, your Honor." (R. 388). 
Anyone who witnessed Mr. Criddle's behavior in court, 
particularly officers of the court, should have recognized 
evidence of Mr. Criddle's incompetence from Mr. Criddle's 
behavior in court prior to trial and prior to sentencing. 
2. Mr. Criddle's Letters Demonstrate His Incompetency. 
Mr. Criddle's progression of letters demonstrates further 
that Mr. Criddle was not thinking or behaving rationally in 
regard to the criminal proceedings against him. A full copy of 
all of his letters in the district court file is included in 
Appendix 2 to this petition. 
For purposes of this issue, this Court should take 
particular notice of several letters demonstrating that Mr. 
Criddle viewed the prosecution of his case as the result of some 
sinister conspiracy between government officials, which 
prosecution the judge and other judicial and political figures 
were personally responsible to dismiss at will. For instance, a 
letter from Mr. Criddle, which was apparently filed in court on 
August 4, 1995, states as follows: 
TO: ALL CITY, COUNTY AND STATE PERSONNEL, 
MY NAME IS BRET CRIDDLE. I DIDN'T COMMIT A CRIME 
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NO WAY NO HOW. 
I WAS ARRESTED, CHARGED, POORLY REPRESENTED AND 
DEFEND, AND TRIED IN FRONT OF A JURY OF PEOPLE WHO WERE 
NOT MY PEERS NOR EVEN CLOSE TO BEING MY PEERS AND I WAS 
CONVICTED. 
ONCE AGAIN, I DID NOT COMMIT A CRIME AND BOTH OF 
THE JUDGES PRESIDING, THE HONORABLE PAT BRIAN, 451 SO. 
200 E S.L.C. UT. AND THE HONORABLE ANNE STIRBA, 240 E. 
400 SO S.L.C. UT. KNOW THAT I DID NOT COMMIT A CRIME. 
I HAVE FAITH AND DO TRUST THAT THEY WILL BOTH "SEE" 
THEIR WAY CLEAR AND RELEASE ME AND ALSO OVER TURN THE 
TWO JURIES' CONVICTIONS. 
I'VE LOST A PLACE TO LIVE AND MY FATHER DISOWNED 
ME BECAUSE OF THIS COMPLETELY, ABOMINABLE, ERROR THAT 
WE DON'T OR LEAST SHOULDN'T BELIEVE CAN HAPPEN. 
IT WILL HURT EVERYONE IF IT IS ALLOWED TO 
CONTINUE. WHEN YOU GO HOME AT NIGHT GO AHEAD AND PRAY 
TO WHOEVER OR WHATEVER YOU LIKE BUT MAKE CERTAIN I OR 
ANY OTHER IS NOT CONFINED FOR A CRIME THEY DIDN'T 
COMMIT EVER AGAIN. IT WILL HURT THAT'S A PROMISE AND 
NO PLEASURE WILL HEAL YOU ENOUGH. WHAT IS HAPPENING, 
AND HAS HAPPENED TO ME, IS CRUEL, IMMORAL, UNETHICAL, 
AND ILLEGAL. IT HAS TO END IMMEDIATELY. 
SINCERELY, BRET CRIDDLE. 
170) . 
The next letter from Mr. Criddle was filed on August 21, 
, and states, 
TO: THE HONORABLE PAT BRIAN 
I'M AFRAID YOU'VE MISUNDERSTOOD. I IN NO WAY 
INTENDED TO THREATEN YOU OR ANYONE ELSE. I HAVE FAITH 
THAT GOOD WILL COME TO GOOD AND BAD WILL COME TO BAD. 
I MEANT TO ALERT AND WARN YOU OF A POTENTIALLY 
DANGEROUS SITUATION. I AM A VERY GOOD HUMAN BEING. 
WHAT HAS HAPPENED TO ME IS CRUEL, IMMORAL, UNETHICAL, 
AND I STILL BELIEVE ILLEGAL (VERY BAD). BEING WHAT I 
AM, AND I AM BEING TRUTHFUL, I AM SELDOM DENIED, AS AN 
INFLUENCE, IN A HEALTHY MAJORITY, AND IT IS TRUE, MORE 
SO, THAT I AM WIDELY ACCEPTED. PEOPLE WILL KNOW WHAT 
IS AND HAS HAPPENED TO ME IS WRONG. IF I HAD COMMITTED 
A CRIME I WOULD STILL HAVE TO INTENTIONALLY MAKE PEOPLE 
BELIEVE THAT IT IS OKAY TO IMPRISON ME. BUT THAT IS 
NOT THE CASE AND I CAN NOT BELIEVE OR MAKE BELIEVE IT 
IS OKAY BECAUSE I DID NOT COMMIT A CRIME. I WAS NOT 
TRIED FAIRLY IN FRONT OF A JURY OF MY PEERS. I SHOULD 
NOT HAVE BEEN CONVICTED. SOME ONE AND/OR SOMETHING HAS 
USED THEIR POWER AND/OR THEIR INFLUENCE TO WRONG ME TO 
MAKE THIS SITUATION TURN OUT NEGATIVELY FOR ME. MY 
WARNING IS THE SAME THERE WILL BE IRREVOCABLE 
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PUNISHMENT (REPERCUSSIONS) FOR ANY AND ALL PARTIES 
INVOLVED IN WRONGFULLY IMPRISONING ME MEANING ANY WHO 
HAVE BY POWER OR POSITION PLACED ME IN PRISONMENT OR 
HAVE NOT USED THEIR POWER OR POSITION TO HAVE ME 
UNIMPPRISONED. ALSO ANY PARTY DOING OR HAS DONE THIS 
TO OTHERS IS LIKEWISE IN JEOPARDY. I AM NOT, AND DO 
NOT BELIEVE, MAKING A THREAT. I SIMPLY UNDERSTAND A 
REASONABLE, FAIR, POSITIVE, WORLD AND IN IT WRONGFUL 
IMPRISONMENT WILL NOT GO UNPUNISHED! 
YOU CAN SHOW THIS LETTER TO ANY ONE YOU LIKE. 
THERE WILL BE GREAT WRONG IN EXISTENCE AS LONG AS YOU 
ALLOW ME TO BE IMPRISONED. 
I DID NOT COMMIT A CRIME AND I MUST BE VINDICATED 
IMMEDIATELY. SINCERELY, BRET CRIDDLE 
P.S. I PERSONALLY DON'T DISLIKE YOU. OUTSIDE OF 
THIS SITUATION I WOULD NOT HAVE ANYTHING AGAINST YOU AT 
ALL. I'M A POSITIVE PERSON AND I DO BELIEVE IN THE 
BEST OF PEOPLE. THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME. 
SINCERELY, BRET CRIDDLE. 
(R. 180-181) . 
Mr. Criddle's next letter was filed September 1, 1995, and 
states, 
Dear Pat, 
If you're reading this the case is probably 
already disposed of. I hope there are no hard 
feelings. Either way this thing went I want you to 
know that I hold nothing personal against you. 
I am a good man and I stand by the fact that I 
didn't commit a crime. 
I truly appreciate any more consideration you're 
had to give my case. 
I'm praying that right now I'm somewhere where I 
can come and go as I choose. 
I've fought. And I believe it was right for me to 
fight for my freedom. I will continue that noble 
endeavor for the rest of my life. 
Have faith in life, love, and all good, all of the 
positive world all of you're life through. 
A brother and a good man through and through, 
Sincerely, Bret Thomas Criddle. 
(R. 182). 
The next letter in the file is file stamped Sept. 1, 1995, 
and states, 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
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MY NAME IS BRET CRIDDLE, I DO NEED YOUR HELP. I 
DIDN'T COMMIT THE CRIME I WAS CHARGED FOR AND I AM NOT 
A CRIMINAL. I WOULD PLEASE LIKE YOU TO INTERVENE ON MY 
BEHALF. I ALSO WOULD LIKE ANY AND ALL INFORMATION 
ABOUT ME TO BE RELEASED TO YOU. I HAVE BEEN IN A VERY 
MENTALLY DISTRESSING SITUATION AND I AM CONCERNED FOR 
MY HEALTH AND WELL BEING. THANK YOU. SINCERELY, BRET 
CRIDDLE 
(R. 183). Appended to this letter is a nineteen page statement, 
which appears to be a list of Mr. Criddle's disagreements with 
the contents of his presentence report, and a letter to the 
courts, the President of the United States, the F.B.I., the CIA 
and various other political and/or governmental figures (R. 184-
202). This is included in Appendix 2 to this brief along with 
all of Mr. Criddle's written correspondence. 
Anyone who was familiar with Mr. Criddle's correspondence 
with the court, particularly officers of the court, should have 
investigated Mr. Criddle's competency prior to trial and prior to 
sentencing. 
3. The 90 Day Diagnostic Report Demonstrates Mr. Criddle's 
Incompetency. 
The diagnostic report submitted for Mr. Criddle's sentencing 
diagnoses Mr. Criddle with "alcohol abuse, adult antisocial 
behavior, and schizotypal personality disorder with paranoid 
features." In discussing Mr. Criddle's behavioral 
characteristics, the report states, 
He is impulsive, self-indulgent, egocentric, immature 
and irritable. He is often tense and overreacts to 
even minor sources of stress. Mr. Criddle tends to be 
suspicious, obsessional, moody, and exhibits a sense of 
grandiosity. His judgment is poor and he has 
difficulty expressing emotions without overreacting or 
over controlling. Mr. Criddle has the potential to act 
out his conflicts in a physical aggressive manner. He 
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is uninhibited in risk taking, has a high energy level, 
and a strong need for stimulation and excitement. 
Furthermore, he engages in rationalization and blames 
others for his difficulties. 
These diagnoses dovetail with Mr. Criddle's behavior in 
court and letters and demonstrate that Mr. Criddle was suffering 
from a "mental disorder" resulting in "his inability to have a 
rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against 
him" and "his inability to ... participate in the proceedings 
against him with a reasonable degree of rational understanding." 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-2. 
C. This Court Should Order A New Trial. 
As previously noted, due process requires trial courts to 
initiate competency proceedings whenever evidence of a 
defendant's incompetency to proceed arises. E.g. State v. Young, 
supra. 
As discussed above, the record in this case is replete with 
evidence of Mr. Criddle's incompetency. Despite trial counsel's 
pre-trial indication that a psychologist and psychiatric intake 
worker of the mental health unit of the jail had examined Mr. 
Criddle and found that he was not suffering from any mental 
health problems at that time(R. 38), Mr. Criddle's behavior in 
court and in writing constitutes evidence of his incompetence, 
which triggered the trial court's duty to initiate full 
competency proceedings under Utah and federal law. Young, supra. 
It was not until after trial that trial counsel voiced a 
need to have Mr. Criddle's mental health evaluated. The first 
sentencing date, May 5, 1995, was continued on the motion of 
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trial counsel, who explained, 
The other thing is -- and this is an inadequacy in 
what I have done for this man -- there are some things 
in here that I did not know about. There are some 
things in here that he should have known about, but did 
not understand. I would like to have an evaluation, 
mental health evaluation, performed on Mr. Criddle, and 
I think this need to be presented to the court. 
(T. 5/5/95 at 3). Judge Brian indicated that Mr. Criddle's 
criminal history was a sufficient basis for sending Mr. Criddle 
to prison, and Mr. Steele indicated that there were errors in the 
history (T. 5/5/95 at 3). Mr. Criddle was removed from the 
courtroom, and then Judge Brian stated, 
You need to know that the Court has some very, 
very strong feelings about this case, and if, in fact, 
there is some mitigation, because of lack of mental 
stability or some type of mental or emotional or 
psychological or psychiatric problem, that should serve 
as mitigation, the Court would like very responsible 
people to make that determination, and provide the 
Court with good information. 
(T. 5/5/95 at 7). 
While Judge Brian was provided with a psychological 
evaluation of Mr. Criddle from the 90 Day Diagnostic Evaluation 
prior to sentencing Mr. Criddle, and while Mr. Fratto argued that 
there should be some intervention other than prison for Mr. 
Criddle's problems (R. 382-385), considering the mental health 
evidence in terms of mitigation was not appropriate, where Mr. 
Criddle was not competent to be tried and convicted in the first 
place. 
The record demonstrates evidence of Mr. Criddle's 
incompetency prior to trial. Both Mr. Criddle's behavior in 
court and his letters to Judge Brian indicate that he was not 
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perceiving or participating in the criminal proceedings in a 
rational way. 
Assuming that evidence of Mr. Criddle's incompetency did not 
arise until after the trial, the trial court should have 
instigated competency proceedings under Young, and trial counsel 
should have moved to arrest judgment under Utah Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 23, which provides, 
At any time prior to the imposition of sentence, 
the court upon its own initiative may, or upon motion 
of a defendant shall, arrest judgment if the facts 
proved or admitted do not constitute a public offense, 
or the defendant is mentally ill, or there is other 
good cause for the arrest of judgment. 
Upon arresting judgment the court may, unless a 
judgment of acquittal of the offense charged is entered 
or jeopardy has attached, order a commitment until the 
defendant is charged anew or retried, or may enter any 
other order as may be just and proper under the 
circumstances. 
Under the plain language of this rule, arrest of judgment is the 
appropriate step to take when the court or parties realize after 
judgment but prior to sentence that the defendant was 
incompetent. See State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591, 594-95 (Utah 
1988) . 
It appears that Mr. Criddle's conviction must be reversed 
under Young, despite the fact that neither trial counsel raised 
the issue of Mr. Criddle's incompetency because the law placed 
the duty squarely on the shoulders of the trial court to 
institute competency proceedings when evidence of competency 
arises. Id. 
In the event that this Court must, the Court may resort 
again to the doctrines of plain error and ineffective assistance 
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of counsel in correcting the due process violation stemming from 
the trial of Mr. Criddle while he was incompetent. See Verde, 
supra, discussing the common showings to be made under the 
doctrines. 
The need to address Mr. Criddle's incompetency should have 
been plain to both the trial court and trial counsel. There is a 
reasonable probability of a different result in the absence of 
the error, for Mr. Criddle may not have been tried and convicted 
at all, had the proper competency proceedings been followed.3 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse Mr. Criddle's conviction and 
remand this case to the trial court for recusal of Judge Brian 
and the immediate institution of competency proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted this day of *?^7#1t^—/ 
1996. 
Candice A. Johns 
Attorney for Mr. Griddle 
3
 In addressing this error, this Court should presume that Mr. 
Criddle was prejudiced by his incompetency. See e.g. Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691-692 (1984)(explaining 
circumstances in which prejudice may be presumed). This is so 
because Mr. Criddle's incompetency constitutes a fundamental flaw 
in the process, which virtually negated Mr. Criddle's right to 
effective assistance of counsel, because it is difficult to 
measure the exact effect that Mr. Criddle's incompetency may have 
had on the proceedings, because the trial court was bound by 
constitutional law to prevent the error, and because the 
prosecutor could easily have avoided the error by filing a 
competency petition. See id. 
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APPENDIX 1 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Constitution of Utah# Article I section 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 12 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have 
the right to appear and defend in person and by 
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to 
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, 
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of 
the county or district in which the offense is alleged 
to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all 
cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before 
final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees 
to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against 
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify 
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, 
nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the 
same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a 
preliminary examination, the function of that 
examination is limited to determining whether probable 
cause exists unless otherwise provided by statute. 
Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of 
reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule 
in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to 
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding 
with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate 
discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
United States Constitution, Amendment VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the Assistance of counsel for his 
defence. 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, section 1 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the Untied States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any States 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-1 
No person who is incompetent to proceed shall be 
tried or punished for a public offense. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-2 
For the purposes of this chapter, a person is 
incompetent to proceed if he is suffering from a mental 
disorder or mental retardation resulting either in: 
(1) his inability to have a rational and factual 
understanding of the proceedings against him or of the 
punishment specified for the offense charged; or 
(2) his inability to consult with his counsel and 
to participate in the proceedings against him with a 
reasonable degree of rational understanding. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-3 
(1) Whenever a person charged with a public 
offense or serving a sentence of imprisonment is or 
becomes incompetent to proceed, as defined in this 
chapter, a petition may be filed in the district court 
of the county where the charge is pending or where the 
person is confined. 
(2) (a) The petition shall contain a certificate 
that it is filed in good faith and on reasonable 
grounds to believe the defendant is incompetent to 
proceed. The petition shall contain a recital of the 
facts, observations, and conversations with the 
defendant that have formed the basis for the petition. 
If filed by defense counsel, the petition shall contain 
such information without invading the lawyer-client 
privilege. 
(b) The petition may be based upon knowledge or 
information and belief and may be filed by the party 
alleged incompetent to proceed, any person acting on 
his behalf, the prosecuting attorney, or any person 
having custody or supervision over the person. 
Utah Code Ann, § 77-15-4 
The court in which a charge is pending may raise 
the issue of the defendant's competency at any time. If 
raised by the court, counsel for each party shall be 
permitted to address the issue of competency. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-5 
(1) When a petition is filed pursuant to § 
77-15-3 raising the issue of the defendant's competency 
to stand trial or when the court raises the issue of 
the defendant's competency pursuant to § 77-15-4, the 
court in which proceedings are pending shall stay all 
proceedings. If the proceedings are in a court other 
than the district court in which the petition is filed, 
the district court shall notify that court of the 
filing of the petition. The district court in which the 
petition is filed shall pass upon the sufficiency of 
the allegations of incompetency. If a petition is 
opposed by either party, the court shall, prior to 
granting or denying the petition, hold a limited 
hearing solely for the purpose of determining the 
sufficiency of the petition. If the court finds that 
the allegations of incompetency raise a bona fide doubt 
as to the defendant's competency to stand trial, it 
shall enter an order for a hearing on the mental 
condition of the person who is the subject of the 
petition. 
(2) (a) After the granting of a petition and 
prior to a full competency hearing, the court may order 
the Department of Human Services to examine the person 
and to report to the court concerning the defendant's 
mental condition. 
(b) The defendant shall be examined by at least 
two mental health experts not involved in the current 
treatment of the defendant. 
(c) If the issue is sufficiently raised in the 
petition or if it becomes apparent that the defendant 
may be incompetent due to mental retardation, at least 
one expert experienced in mental retardation assessment 
shall evaluate the defendant. Upon appointment of the 
experts, the petitioner or other party as directed by 
the court shall provide information and materials to 
the examiners relevant to a determination of the 
defendant's competency and shall provide copies of the 
charging document, arrest or incident reports 
pertaining to the charged offense, known criminal 
history information, and known prior mental health 
evaluations and treatments. 
(d) The court may make the necessary orders to 
provide the information listed in Subsection (c) to the 
examiners. 
(3) During the examination under Subsection (2), 
unless the court or the executive director of the 
department directs otherwise, the defendant shall be 
retained in the same custody or status he was in at the 
time the examination was ordered. 
(4) The experts shall in the conduct of their 
examination and in their report to the court consider 
and address, in addition to any other factors 
determined to be relevant by the experts: 
(a) the defendant's present capacity to: 
(i) comprehend and appreciate the 
charges or allegations against him; 
(ii) disclose to counsel pertinent 
facts, events, and states of mind; 
(iii) comprehend and appreciate the 
range and nature of possible penalties, if 
applicable, that may be imposed in the 
proceedings against him; 
(iv) engage in reasoned choice of legal 
strategies and options; 
(v) understand the adversary nature of 
the proceedings against him; 
(vi) manifest appropriate courtroom 
behavior; and 
(vii) testify relevantly, if applicable; 
(b) the impact of the mental disorder, or mental 
retardation, if any, on the nature and quality of the 
defendant's relationship with counsel; 
(c) if psychoactive medication is currently being 
administered: 
(i) whether the medication is necessary 
to maintain the defendant's competency; and 
(ii) the effect of the medication, if 
any, on the defendant's demeanor and affect 
and ability to participate in the 
proceedings. 
(5) If the expert's opinion is that the defendant 
is incompetent to proceed, the expert shall indicate in 
the report: 
(a) which of the above factors contributes to the 
defendant's incompetency; 
(b) the nature of the defendant's mental disorder 
or mental retardation and its relationship to the 
factors contributing to the defendant's incompetency; 
(c) the treatment or treatments appropriate and 
available; and 
(d) the defendant's capacity to give informed 
consent to treatment to restore competency. 
(6) The experts examining the defendant shall 
provide an initial report to the court and the 
prosecuting and defense attorneys within 3 0 days of the 
receipt of the court's order. The report shall inform 
the court of the examiner's opinion concerning the 
competency of the defendant to stand trial, or, in the 
alternative, the examiner may inform the court in 
writing that additional time is needed to complete the 
report. If the examiner informs the court that 
additional time is needed, the examiner shall have up 
to an additional 3 0 days to provide the report to the 
court and counsel. The examiner must provide the report 
within 60 days from the receipt of the court's order 
unless, for good cause shown, the court authorizes an 
additional period of time to complete the examination 
and provide the report. 
(7) Any written report submitted by the experts 
shall: 
(a) identify the specific matters referred for 
evaluation; 
(b) describe the procedures, techniques, and tests 
used in the examination and the purpose or purposes for 
each; 
(c) state the expert's clinical observations, 
findings, and opinions on each issue referred for 
examination by the court, and indicate specifically 
those issues, if any, on which the expert could not 
give an opinion; and 
(d) identify the sources of information used by 
the expert and present the basis for the expert's 
clinical findings and opinions. 
(8) (a) Any statement made by the defendant in 
the course of any competency examination, whether the 
examination is with or without the consent of the 
defendant, any testimony by the expert based upon such 
statement, and any other fruits of the statement may 
not be admitted in evidence against the defendant in 
any criminal proceeding except on an issue respecting 
mental condition on which the defendant has introduced 
evidence. The evidence may be admitted, however, where 
relevant to a determination of the defendant's 
competency. 
(b) Prior to examining the defendant, examiners 
should specifically advise the defendant of the limits 
of confidentiality as provided under this subsection. 
(9) When the report is received the court shall 
set a date for a mental hearing which shall be held in 
not less than five and not more than 15 days, unless 
the court enlarges the time for good cause. The hearing 
shall be conducted according to the procedures outlined 
in Subsections 62A-12-234(9)(b) through (9)(f). Any 
person or organization directed by the department to 
conduct the examination may be subpoenaed to testify at 
the hearing. If the experts are in conflict as to the 
competency of the defendant, all experts should be 
called to testify at the hearing if reasonably 
available. The court may call any examiner to testify 
at the hearing who is not called by the parties. If the 
court calls an examiner, counsel for the parties may 
cross-examine the expert. 
(10) A person shall be presumed competent unless 
the court, by a preponderance of the evidence, finds 
the person incompetent to proceed. The burden of proof 
is upon the proponent of incompetency at the hearing. 
An adjudication of incompetency to proceed shall not 
operate as an adjudication of incompetency to give 
informed consent for medical treatment or for any other 
purpose, unless specifically set forth in the court 
order. 
(11) (a) If the court finds the defendant 
incompetent to stand trial, its order shall contain 
findings addressing each of the factors in Subsections 
77-15-5(4)(a) and (b). The order issued pursuant to 
Subsection 77-15-6(1) which the court sends to the 
facility where the defendant is committed or to the 
person who is responsible for assessing his progress 
toward competency shall be provided contemporaneously 
with the transportation and commitment order of the 
defendant, unless exigent circumstances require earlier 
commitment in which case the court shall forward the 
order within five working days of the order of 
transportation and commitment of the defendant. 
(b) The order finding the defendant incompetent to 
stand trial shall be accompanied by: 
(i) copies of the reports of the experts 
filed with the court pursuant to the order of 
examination if not provided previously; 
(ii) copies of any of the psychiatric, 
psychological, or social work reports 
submitted to the court relative to the mental 
condition of the defendant; 
(iii) any other documents made available 
to the court by either the defense or the 
prosecution, pertaining to the defendant's 
current or past mental condition. 
(12) If the court finds it necessary to order the 
defendant transported prior to the completion of 
findings and compilation of documents required under 
Subsection (11), the transportation and commitment 
order delivering the defendant to the Utah State 
Hospital, or other mental health facility as directed 
by the executive director of the Department of Human 
Services or his designee, shall indicate that the 
defendant's commitment is based upon a finding of 
incompetency, and the mental health facility's copy of 
the order shall be accompanied by the reports of any 
experts filed with the court pursuant to the order of 
examination. The executive director of the Department 
of Human Services or his designee may refuse to accept 
a defendant as a patient unless he is accompanied by a 
transportation and commitment order which is 
accompanied by the reports. 
(13) Upon a finding of incompetency to stand 
trial by the court, the prosecuting and defense 
attorneys shall provide information and materials 
relevant to the defendant's competency to the facility 
where the defendant is committed or to the person 
responsible for assessing his progress towards 
competency. In addition to any other materials, the 
prosecuting attorney shall provide: 
(a) copies of the charging document and supporting 
affidavits or other documents used in the determination 
of probable cause; 
(b) arrest or incident reports prepared by a law 
enforcement agency pertaining to the charged offense; 
(c) information concerning the defendant's known 
criminal history. 
(14) The court may make any reasonable order to 
insure compliance with this section. 
(15) Failure to comply with this section shall 
not result in the dismissal of criminal charges. 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 23 
At any time prior to the imposition of sentence, 
the court upon its own initiative may, or upon motion 
of a defendant shall, arrest judgment if the facts 
proved or admitted do not constitute a public offense, 
or the defendant is mentally ill, or there is other 
good cause for the arrest of judgment. 
Upon arresting judgment the court may, unless a 
judgment of acquittal of the offense charged is entered 
or jeopardy has attached, order a commitment until the 
defendant is charged anew or retried, or may enter any 
other order as may be just and proper under the 
circumstances. 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 
(a) If, by reason of death, sickness, or other 
disability, the judge before whom a trial has begun is 
unable to continue with the trial, any other judge of 
that court or any judge assigned by the presiding 
officer of the Judicial Council, upon certifying that 
he has familiarized himself with the record of the 
trial, may, unless otherwise disqualified, proceed with 
and finish the trial, but if the assigned judge is 
satisfied that neither he nor another substitute judge 
can proceed with the trial, he may, in his discretion, 
grant a new trial. 
(b) If, by reason of death, sickness, or other 
disability, the judge before whom a defendant has been 
tried is unable to perform the duties required of the 
court after a verdict of guilty, any other judge of 
that court or any judge assigned by the presiding 
officer of the Judicial Council may perform those 
duties. 
(c) If the prosecution or a defendant in any 
criminal action or proceeding files an affidavit that 
the judge before whom the action or proceeding is to be 
tried or heard has a bias or prejudice, either against 
the party or his attorney or in favor of any opposing 
party to the suit, the judge shall proceed no further 
until the challenge is disposed of. Every affidavit 
shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief 
that the bias or prejudice exists and shall be filed as 
soon as practicable after the case has been assigned or 
the bias or prejudice is known. No affidavit may be 
filed unless accompanied by a certificate of counsel of 
record that the affidavit and application are made in 
good faith. 
(d) If the challenged judge questions the 
sufficiency of the allegation of disqualification, he 
shall enter an order directing that a copy be forthwith 
certified to another named judge of the same court or 
of a court of like jurisdiction, which judge shall then 
pass upon the legal sufficiency of the allegations. If 
the challenged judge does not question the legal 
sufficiency of the affidavit, or if the judge to whom 
the affidavit is certified finds that it is legally 
sufficient, another judge shall be called to try the 
case or to conduct the proceeding. If the judge to whom 
the affidavit is certified does not find the affidavit 
to be legally sufficient, he shall enter a finding to 
that effect and the challenged judge shall proceed with 
the case or proceeding. 
(e) (i) If the prosecution or a defendant in a 
criminal action believes that a fair and impartial 
trial cannot be had in the jurisdiction where the 
action is pending, either may, by motion, supported by 
an affidavit setting forth facts, ask to have the trial 
of the case transferred to another jurisdiction. 
(ii) If the court is satisfied that the 
representations made in the affidavit are true and 
justify transfer of the case, the court shall enter an 
order for the removal of the case to the court of 
another jurisdiction free from the objection and all 
records pertaining to the case shall be transferred 
forthwith to the court in the other county. If the 
court is not satisfied that the representations so made 
justify transfer of the case, the court shall either 
enter an order denying the transfer or order a formal 
hearing in court to resolve the matter and receive 
further evidence with respect to the alleged prejudice. 
(f) When a change of judge or place of trial is 
ordered all documents of record concerning the case 
shall be transferred without delay to the judge who 
shall hear the case. 
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TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
MY NAME IS BRET CRIDDLE, I DO NEED YOUR HELP. I D T W ^ P u ' ^™k*HbJjT3*k 
COMMIT THE CRIME I WAS CHARGED FOR AND I AM NOT A CRIMINAL. I 
WOULD PLEASE LIKE YOU TO INTERVENE ON MY BEHALF. I ALSO WOULD 
LIKE ANY AND ALL INFORMATION ABOUT ME TO BE RELEASED TO YOU. 
I HAVE BEEN IN A VERY MENTALLY DISTRESSING SITUATION AND I AM 
CONCERNED FOR MY HEALTH AND WELL BEING. 
THANK YOU. 
Sincerely, 
BRET CRIDDLE 
A A f\ A r\ *\ 
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BECAUSE I AM IN DISAGREEMENT WITH SOME OF THE FINDINGS IN MY 
PRESENTENCE REPORT AND SOME OF THE THINGS THAT ARE IMPLIED BY 
IT. THIS IS A BRIEF BUT ACCURATE EXPLANATION OF MY PRIOR 
RECORD. 
1 . TRAFFIC 5 - 1 7 - 8 3 OPERATING AN OF ROAD VEHICLE ( MOTOR CYCLE ) 
ON A PUBLIC ROAD. FINED. 
2 . ALCOHOL 4 - 1 1 - 8 5 AT A SPRING PARTY DURING SCHOOL HOURS THE VICE 
PRINCIPAL CAME TO THE FRONT 
3 . DOOR. WE ALL FLED. LATER WE WERE APPREHENDED BY THE POLICE. 
WORK HOURS ORDERED. 
4 . TRAFFIC 9 - 1 1 - 8 5 ATTEMPTING TO MAKE A U TURN ON A RAINY DAY I 
HIT ANOTHER VEHICLE. I PANICKED AND 
5 . FLED. I LOST MY DRIVING PRIVILEGE FOR SIX MONTHS. AND FINED. 
6 . TRUANCY 1 1 - 7 - 8 5 SIXTEEN AND MOBILE. 3 - 4 - 8 6 FINED. 3 - 2 4 - 8 6 FINE 
DISMISSED. 
7 . TRAFFIC 3 - 2 0 - 8 6 SPEEDING LATE FOR WORK. CITED FOR 85 M.P.H. IN 
A 55 M.P.H. ZONE. 
8 . OPEN CONTAINER/DRINKING IN A VEHICLE. 4 - 1 6 - 8 6 DRINKING A BEER 
WITH A FRIEND. COUNSELING 
9 . ORDERED. 7 - 3 - 8 6 FINED. 
1 0 . ALCOHOL/DRUG PARAPHERNALIA 5 - 3 - 8 6 ON THE WAY TO BOW HUNT FISH, 
( CARP ) , I AND TWO OTHERS 
1 1 . WERE PULLED OVER AND TAKEN IN. WE HAD ALL BEEN DRINKING AND I 
HAD A MARIJUANA PIPE IN MY 
1 2 . POSSESSION. COUNSELING AND WORK HOURS ORDERED. 
1 3 . ALCOHOL 1 - 6 - 8 7 I AND A FRIEND SLID OFF A SNOWY ROAD. WE HAD 
BEEN DRINKING. ON THE WAY TO 
1 4 . CALL A TOW TRUCK WE WERE STOPPED, QUESTIONED AND TAKEN IN FOR 
DRINKING UNDER AGE. FINED 
1 5 . AND COUNSELING ORDERED 3 - 1 - 8 7 COUNSELING REORDERED. 4 - 9 - 8 7 
COUNSELING RE-RE-ORDERED. 
1 6 . CRIMINAL ACT-ARMED ROBBERY FIRST DEGREE FELONY. 4 - 1 3 - 8 7 I WENT 
INTO A GAS STATION WITH 
1 7 . A GUN AND TOLD THEM TO GIVE ME THE MONEY. BEFORE THEY GAVE ME 
THE MONEY I PANICKED, SAID 
1 8 . "APRIL FOOLS", AND WALKED AWAY. 4 - 2 2 - 8 7 I RETURNED TO THE SAME 
GAS STATION, THIS TIME 
1 9 . I TAKE THE MONEY AND I AM APPREHENDED A BLOCK AWAY. I SPENT 
NINETY DAYS IN AN OBSERVATION 
2 0 . AND ASSESSMENT YOUTH CORRECTION FACILITY. I WAS PLACED ON 
PROBATION AFTER. 
2 1 . ALCOHOL 7 - 2 0 - 8 9 I RAN AWAY FROM AN APPROACHING POLICE CAR. I 
WAS INTOXICATED AND I WAS 
2 2 . PLACED IN JAIL FOR FOURTEEN DAYS. 166 OR 180 DAYS IN JAIL 
SUSPENDED. $ 5 0 0 . 0 0 DOLLARS FINE PAID. 
2 3 . COUNSELING ORDERED AND HAD TO TAKE ANTABUSE. 
2 4 . TRAFFIC & OTHER WARRANT. 9 - 2 6 - 9 0 I , DRUNK, NAKED, WITH THE DOOR 
TO MY APARTMENT 
/\ i\ A A r\ i 
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1. OPEN, HAD MUSIC TOO LOUD. THE POLICE CAME TO TELL ME TO KEEP IT 
DOWN. I HAD TWO OUT 
2. STANDING WARRANTS - ONE FOR RUNNING A RED LIGHT AND THE OTHER 
FOR SELLING PERFUME 
3. WITHOUT A LICENSE. I SPENT THREE DAYS IN JAIL. NINETY DAYS 
SUSPENDED SENTENCE. 
4. PLACED ON PROBATION. PAID ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY FIVE DOLLAR 
FINE FOR 
5. A TRAFFIC TICKET (WHICH WAS FROM AN ACCIDENT BUT HAD NOTHING TO 
DO WITH A PEDESTRIAN) 
6. AND THE OTHER WARRANT WAS DISMISSED. 
7. TRAFFIC WARRANT. 3-14-91 STOPPED BY CAMPUS POLICE FOR A STUNT 
WHILE TRYING TO GET 
8. A RIDE HOME FROM THE U. OF U. I WAS TAKEN IN FOR TWO 
OUTSTANDING TRAFFIC TICKETS. 
9. I SPENT SIX DAYS IN SALT LAKE COUNTY JAIL AND ONE NIGHT IN 
DAVIS COUNTY JAIL. FINED. 
10. POLICE ERROR ALCOHOL. 4-28-91 TWO OFFICERS APPROACHED ME IN THE 
DOORWAY OF MY APARTMENT. 
11. I HAD HEARD THEIR WALKI TALKI AND HAD LOOKED OUT TO SEE WHAT 
WAS THE MATTER. 
12. THEY ASKED ME "WHO HAS THE CHAIN?" ?!? I TOLD THEM I DIDN'T 
KNOW. THEY STARTED TOWARDS 
13. MY NEIGHBORS DOOR ACROSS THE HALL. IT WAS IN BETWEEN ONE THIRTY 
AND TWO O'CLOCK IN THE 
14. MORNING. I TOLD HIM THE PEOPLE AROUND HERE ARE ASLEEP SO DON'T 
START KNOCKING ON 
15. DOORS. THEY TURNED AROUND AND BEGAN ENTERING MY APARTMENT 
WITHOUT ASKING. I SAID, 
16. "YOU CAN'T JUST WALK..." I AWOKE ON THE FLOOR OF MY ENTRYWAY IN 
HANDCUFFS AND 
1 7 . IN PAIN. I WAS TAKEN IN AND RELEASED. FINED $ 5 0 . 0 0 PAID. 
1 8 . COMMITTED. 6 - 2 4 - 9 1 I WAS PLACED IN SALT LAKE COUNTY JAIL FOR 
NINETY DAYS. BEFORE 
19. THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE HEARING MY PROBATION OFFICER SAID I 
WOULD ONLY SPEND TEN 
20. DAYS IN JAIL. 
21. THEFT. 11-2-91 I WAS COMPELLED TO CROSS-DRESS (WHICH WAS 
SOMETHING I HADN'T BEEN COMPELLED 
2 2 . TO DO FOR QUITE SOMETIME) IN A DRUNKEN STUPOR I TRIED TO 
SHOPLIFT A BRA AND NYLONS. 
2 3 . I WAS APPREHENDED AND ASSAULTED BY STORE SECURITY OFFICER BEN 
JONES. I WAS TOLD 
2 4 . BY A PUBLIC DEFENDER I WOULD BE PLEADING GUILTY TO JUST RETAIL 
THEFT. SUSPENDED 
2 5 . 15 DAY JAIL SENTENCE. FINED $ 3 6 1 . 0 0 FROM $ 5 6 1 . 0 0 . 
2 6 . THEFT WARRANT 7 - 2 9 - 9 2 AFTER SPEAKING TO A YOUNG WOMAN AT THE 
POOL OF MY APARTMENT 
2 7 . COMPLEX. ALTHOUGH I HAD DONE NO WRONG OUTSIDE OF A JIB OR TWO, 
HER MOTHER CAME AFTER ME 
A n /\ A r\ +> 
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1. SCREAMING SOMETHING ABOUT ME "KISSING ON" HER DAUGHTER AND 
CLAIMING SHE WOULD CALL THE 
2. POLICE IF I TOUCHED HER AGAIN. I DIDN'T TOUCH THE "FIRST" TIME 
LET ALONE KISS HER 
3. ANYWHERE. SO I TOLD HER THAT I WOULD BE CALLING THE POLICE TO 
FILE A COMPLAINT FOR HARASSMENT. 
4. THIS WAS NOT THE FIRST TIME I HAD A "RUN IN" WITH HER AND HER 
DAUGHTERS AND I WAS 
5. TIRED OF BEING THE TARGET THEY VENT THEIR FRUSTRATIONS ON. 
THREE GUYS APPROACHED ME 
6. SHORTLY AFTER AND ASKED ME IF I WAS THE ONE WHO HAD BEEN 
"HARASSING" MICHELE I SAID 
7. I HAD TALKED TO HER. THEY SAID I HAD TO COME WITH THEM AND THEN 
THEY BEAT ME 
8. SEVERELY. THE POLICE SHOWED UP AND TOOK ME TO JAIL FOR A 
WARRANT. I WAS ALSO CHARGED 
9. WITH DISORDERLY CONDUCT AND PUBLIC INTOXICATION. (I WAS ON 
PRIVATE PROPERTY). THE WARRANT 
10. WAS DISMISSED. FINED. 
11. WARRANT PUBLIC INTOX. 5-2-93 LATE, KNOCKING ON THE DOOR OF A 
WOMAN I HAD A DATE WITH 
12. TO FIND OUT WHY SHE DIDN'T SHOW UP. THE POLICE SHOWED UP AND 
TOOK ME IN FOR AN OUTSTANDING 
13. WARRANT. I BAILED OUT. FINED. 
14. INTOX. TRESPASS. 3-30-94 I MET A DANCER (STRIPPER) AT A BAR. 
SHE GAVE ME HER NUMBER. 
15. I CALLED HER. SHE INVITED ME TO HER PLACE AND WE HAD SEX. TWO 
DAYS LATER SHE TOLD ME SHE 
16. WAS PREGNANT AND NEEDED ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY DOLLARS TO TAKE 
CARE OF IT. (SHE BLAMED ME) 
17. I GAVE HER THE MONEY. THE EVENING OF 3-30-94 SHE SAW ME AND 
TOLD ME SHE WAS PREGNANT AGAIN. 
18. I TOLD HER NOT ANOTHER DIME. SHE CALLED THE POLICE AND SAID I 
HAD A GUN AND WAS GOING TO SHOOT 
19. HER. I WAS TAKEN TO JAIL. SHE ALSO TOLD THE POLICE THAT I HAD 
RAPED HER. AFTER HEARING THIS 
20. I TOLD THE POLICE WHAT HAD HAPPENED AND WAS RELEASED A FEW 
HOURS LATER. THE COUNTY 
21. PROSECUTOR TALKED ME INTO ENTERING A PLEA OF AMBIANCE. FINED 
$150.00. 
22. THEFT. 4-23-94 JOHN REMINGTON CHAINED A TRAILER THAT I BELIEVE 
TO BE ABANDONED, 
23. TO THE BUMPER OF HIS TRUCK. I DIDN'T ASSIST HIM BECAUSE I HAD 
TOLD HIM NOT TO TAKE IT 
24. UNTIL I COULD GAIN PERMISSION FROM THE MANAGER OF MY APARTMENT 
COMPLEX AND BECAUSE 
25. THE PREVIOUS DAY JOHN HAD TAKEN A TRAILER THAT I BELIEVED WAS 
HIS (WHICH I ALSO DID 
26. NOT ASSIST IN ACQUIRING SIMPLY BECAUSE I DIDN'T WANT TO GET MY 
CLOTHES DIRTY) BUT 
27. HE TOLD SEVERAL PEOPLE, LATER. THAT "WE" HAD STOLEN IT. I WAS 
DISTURBED BY 
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JOHN AND HIS ACTIONS. I WOULD HAVE LEFT THE SITUATION BUT EVERY 
TIME 
I CONSIDERED IT I BECAME AWARE THAT I WOULD BE INJURED OR EVEN 
KILLED. 
I WAS HELD CAPTIVE AND I COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY OR HOW. WHEN 
WE 
WERE FINALLY CAUGHT BY THE POLICE BECAUSE OF JOHNS PURPOSELY, 
FAST AND DANGEROUS 
DRIVING, I WAS VERY DISTRAUGHT. I WAS NO LONGER, AND HAD NOT 
BEEN 
FOR QUITE SOMETIME, IN CONTROL OF MY ACTIONS AND WORDS. BUT 
I DID NOT TRY TO FLEE FROM THE POLICE. I WAS TAKEN IN AND 
QUESTIONED BY THE 
POLICE. I TOLD THE OFFICER SEVERAL TIMES THAT I BELIEVED THE 
TRAILER WAS 
ABANDONED I ALSO TOLD HIM THAT I DID NOT ASSIST BECAUSE I HAD 
TOLD JOHN TO 
WAIT UNTIL I COULD GAIN PERMISSION FROM THE MANAGER OF MY 
APARTMENT COMPLEX. 
THE OFFICERS THAT TOOK ME TO SALT LAKE COUNTY JAIL TOLD ME THAT 
I WOULD NOT 
BE CHARGED WITH THEFT. I WAS CHARGED WITH SECOND DEGREE FELONY 
THEFT. 
WHILE IN JAIL I WAS CHARGED WITH A SECOND FELONY THEFT OF THE 
FIRST TRAILER 
THAT JOHN HAD TAKEN AS WELL. I WAS IN JAIL FOR TWENTY EIGHT 
DAYS BEFORE 
I MADE BAIL AND WAS RELEASED. TRIAL. 
7-28-94 MY PUBLIC DEFENDER BOB STEELE POSTPONED COURT. I WAS 
NOT TAKEN 
IN NOR WAS I NOTIFIED OF A WARRANT BEING ISSUED. 
1-19-95 I WAS IN FRONT OF SMITHS FOOD KING IN MY' NEIGHBORHOOD. 
I 
WAS APPROACHED BY AN OFFICER. HE SAID SOMEONE WAS SUSPICIOUS OF 
ME. ( I DON'T KNOW 
WHO OR WHY ). I HAVE FRIENDS THAT WORK THERE. I SHOP THERE TWO 
TOO THREE TIMES A 
WEEK AND WAS THERE ALMOST DAILY FOR OVER A YEAR. THE OFFICER 
CHECKED, I HAD WARRANTS I 
BELIEVE THAT I SHOULDN'T HAVE HAD. I SPENT TEN DAYS FOR 
CRIMINAL TRESPASS AND I 
WAS RELEASED. 
2-9-95 ALTHOUGH I WAS IN COMPLIANCE WITH PRETRIAL SERVICES I 
WAS RE ARRESTED 
AT MY HOME ( APARTMENT ) UPON PAT BRIANS ORDERS AT LEAST THAT 
IS WHAT I WAS TOLD. 
I WAS CONVICTED, I BELIEVE WRONGFULLY OF TWO SECOND DEGREE 
FELONY 
THEFTS. I AM PRESENTLY IN PRISON AWAITING SENTENCING. 
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PAGE ONE - FACE OF PRESENTENCE REPORT 
I WAS NOT TRIED AND FOUND GUILTY OF A JURY OF MY PEERS. THE 
PEOPLE SELECTED 
FOR MY JURIES WERE NOT MY PEERS NOR EVEN CLOSE TO BEING MY 
PEERS. MY ATTORNEY 
BOB STEELE HAD ME TOO INSECURE FOR ME TO HAVE ANY VIABLE 
INFLUENCE IN THE JURY SELECTION. 
PAGE TWO A. 
PARAGRAPH ONE. THE PEOPLE AT MIDAS MUFFLER DID CUT THE LOCK OFF 
THE BACK OF THE 
TRAILER. ITEMS WERE NOT FALLING OUT OF THE BACK OF THE TRAILERS 
AS JOHN DROVE TO 
THE SIDE OF DESERT INDUSTRIES. I DID NOT RUN FROM THE OFFICER. 
PARAGRAPH THREE. ALTHOUGH IT IS POSSIBLE BROILER CLAIMED I SOLD 
THIS "PRESSURE 
WASHER", I WAS NOT INVOLVED IN THAT. I WAS TO BUSY TRYING TO 
FIND A WAY TO 
STOP JOHN REMINGTON WITHOUT GETTING HURT. 
PAGE FIVE F. 
THE NUMBER OF DAYS INCARCERATED WILL TOTAL 224 AUGUST TWENTY 
EIGHT. 
PAGE SIX A. 
REFER TO PAGE ONE LINE FIVE THIS REPORT. NOT ONLY WAS I CITED 
AND FINED, I ALSO 
LOST MY DRIVING PRIVILEGE. 
PAGE ONE LINE SIX - COVERS THREE RECORDS ON THE PRESENTENCE 
REPORT. ALL THREE 
PERTAIN TO THE SAME OFFENSE. 
PAGE 1 LINE 8 COVERS TWO RECORDS ON THE PRESENTENCE REPORT BOTH 
PERTAIN TO THE SAME 
OFFENCE. 
PAGE SIX AND SEVEN A. 
PAGE 1 LINE 13. 14. 15. COVERS THREE RECORDS ON THE PRESENTENCE 
REPORT ALL THREE 
PERTAIN TO THE SAME OFFENSE. 3-1-87 IS RECORDED AS A SEPARATE 
OFFENSE. 
PAGE SEVEN A. 
PAGE 1 LINE 16-20 I MADE A BAD MISTAKE. I TOOK THE COURT AND 
ITS WARNINGS 
VERY SERIOUSLY. I MADE A DECISION AGAINST A LIFE OF CRIME THEN. 
I PAID FOR THE 
CRIME AND I HAVE PAID MORE FOR IT SINCE. 
n n n 1 R a 
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1. PAGE SEVEN B. 
2. PAGE 1 LINE 22 - 7-20-89 - I PAYED THE FINE. ALSO I ATTENDED 
COUNSELING AND I HAD 
3. TO TAKE ANTABUSE AS A PART OF IT. 
4. PAGE 2 LINE 4 & 5 - 9-26-90 - I PAYED ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY 
FIVE DOLLARS FOR AN OVER 
5. DUE TRAFFIC TICKET. THE ACCIDENT THE TICKET RESULTED FROM 
INVOLVED NO PEDESTRIANS. 
6. PRESENTENCE REPORT - ( DRIVER - PEDS - ACC ). 
7. PAGE EIGHT B. 
8. PAGE 2 LINE 10-17 - 4-28-91 - NO WARRANT FOR OPEN CONTAINER AND 
DRINKING IN A VEHICLE. REFER 
9. TO PAGE 1 LINE 8 AND 9. - WAS TOLD BY PUBLIC DEFENDER BOB 
STEELE THAT I WOULD BE 
10. PLEADING GUILTY TO PUBLIC INTOX. PAYED FIFTY DOLLAR FINE. 
11. PAGE 2 LINE 18.19.20. - 6-24-91 AGAIN NO WARRANT FOR OPEN 
CONTAINER AND DRINKING IN A 
12. VEHICLE, REFER TO PAGE 1 LINES 8 AND 9. - I WAS TOLD THAT I 
WOULD BE SPENDING ONLY TEN DAYS 
13. IN JAIL FOR FAILURE TO PAY A THREE HUNDRED DOLLAR FINE THAT 
PROBATION HAD AGREED TO LET ME 
14. PAY INSTEAD OF WORK HOURS. I WAS COMMITTED FOR NINETY DAYS. 
15. PAGE 2 LINE 21-25 - 11-2-91 - I MADE A MISTAKE BUT IT WAS NO 
REASON FOR THE OFFICER 
16. TO ASSAULT ME. I DID NOT RESIST ARREST AND I WAS TO INTOXICATED 
TO DO SO ANYWAY. I 
17. SHOULDN'T HAVE BEEN CHARGED OR CONVICTED OF ASSAULT. 
18. PAGE 2 & 3 LINE 26. 27.& 1-10 - 7-29-92 - I WAS THE VICTIM OF A 
VIOLENT CRIME. I WAS INJURED 
19. SEVERELY, AND I WAS THE ONE TAKEN AWAY IN HAND CUFFS. 
20. PAGE 3 LINE 14-21-3-30-94 NO BENCH WARRANTS FOR PUBLIC INTOX. I 
WAS CHARGED WITH PUBLIC 
21. INTOX IN THIS PARTICULAR INCIDENT. - FINE ORIGINALLY $150.00 
DOLLARS. I SPENT TEN DAYS 
22. IN JAIL INSTEAD. 
23. PAGE EIGHT B. AND NINE A. 
24. PAGE 3-4 LINE 22-27 AND 1-15 -4-23-94 - NO WARRANT FOR THEFT 
ISSUED UNTIL 1-19-95 AND NONE 
25. SHOULD HAVE BEEN. I HAD WRITTEN ONE COURT AND APPEARED AT THE 
OTHER. I WAS TOLD THAT 
26. MY TRIAL DATE WOULD BE RESCHEDULED AND WAS WAITING FOR A 
RESPONSE FROM BOTH 
27. COURTS. PAGE 4 LINE 16-22. 
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PAGE 7 
PAGE NINE PROBATION/PAROLE HISTORY. 
PARAGRAPH TWO - REFER PAGE 1 LINE 22 & 23. PAGE 6 LINE 2 & 3. 
PARAGRAPH THREE - 80 WORK HOURS WAS CHANGED TO 300 DOLLAR FINE. 
PAGE 6 LINE 12,13, AND 14. 
FINE OF ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY FIVE DOLLARS IS FROM A TRAFFIC 
TICKET. PAGE 2 LINE 4 & 5. I AM NOT 
AND WAS NOT AN ALCOHOLIC AND I AM NOT IN "DENIAL". I "BOUGHT 
IN" TO CLAIMING I WAS AN ALCOHOLIC 
WHEN I WAS A TEENAGER BECAUSE MY FRIENDS DID. I DID ATTEND "AA" 
MEETINGS AND I FOUND THAT I WOULD 
ONLY BE TAKING OTHERS "AIR". I WAS EVALUATED AT ISAT., THE 
ALLEGED EVALUATOR WAS BRUSQUE AND 
INSENSITIVE,HE DID NOT ASK MANY QUESTIONS AND HE WAS TOO BOLD, 
(UN OPEN) TO BE RESPONSIVE TOO. I 
DID WANT HELP AND I WANTED TO GO THROUGH ISATS PROGRAM, MY ONLY 
TREPIDATION WAS 
THE CLOSE TO 1000 DOLLAR FEE. PAGE TEN PROBATION/PAROLE HISTORY 
CONTINUED. I TOLD HIM THAT I HAD CROSS-DRESSED IN 
AN EFFORT TO EXPLAIN THAT I HAD BEEN VIOLATED AND CROSS-DRESSED 
AFTER BECAUSE IT WAS 
SUGGESTED THAT I DO SO TO FEEL WELL AGAIN (AFTER THE 
VIOLATION). I BELIEVE A REAL THERAPISTS WOULD 
HAVE BEEN ACCEPTING ENOUGH TO AT LEAST HEAR ME OUT AND HAVE 
SOME VIABLE INPUT. I HAD BEEN HURT 
AND DEGRADED ON A REGULAR BASIS SINCE SHORTLY AFTER I HAD 
REACHED PUBERTY. I TOLD HIM I WOULD 
HAVE A HARD TIME COMING UP WITH THE MONEY AND HE TOLD ME I 
WOULD NOT HAVE TO GO THROUGH 
THERAPY UNLESS HE HAD THE COURT ORDER ME TOO. BUT I WANTED TO! 
ISAT WAS NO HELP ! ANYWAY I 
BELIEVE THE INTERVIEW WAS CONFIDENTIAL AND PRIVATE, BUT IT WAS 
SHARED ON MY PRESENTENCE REPORT 
AND WITH GOD ONLY KNOWS (I WISH) WHO ELSE. AGAIN, MY ONLY 
MISGIVING ABOUT THERAPY WAS 
THE MONEY. MY BROTHER DID FREEZE TO DEATH. I DID LOSE MY JOB 
OVER IT. ME AND MY FAMILY DID 
HAVE A FUNERAL AND BURIAL TO GO TO AND I HATED IT ! IT DIDN'T 
MAKE SENSE. AGAIN MY 
125 DOLLAR FINE WAS AN UNPAID TRAFFIC TICKET. PAGE 2 LINE 4 & 
5_^  PAGE 7 LINE 4. THIS 
WAS A THIRD MISDEMEANOR AND THIRD CHARGE BESIDE TRAFFIC ON MY 
ADULT RECORD. "MAXIMUM" 
I REALLY DON'T THINK SO. (ADULT RECORD FROM 8-87 TO 9-90) - I 
WAS TOLD I WOULD SPEND TEN 
DAYS IN JAIL. THIRTY DOLLARS FOR EACH UNPAID FINE. PAGE 6 LINE 
12,13,14. PAGE 7 LINE 3 -
PAGE TEN PARAGRAPH TWO 
MY BROTHER WAS HOMELESS BECAUSE OF TO MANY "RUN INS" WITH THE 
POLICE AND MY FATHER WAS 
TIRED OF IT. - MY MOTHER PRESENTLY IS A REAL ESTATE AGENT AND 
MY FATHER IS A 
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1. FACILITY SHIFT ENGINEER AT THIOKOL. - IT IS A DEFENSE TO THE 
CHARGE 
2. OF THEFT IF THE ACTOR BELIEVES HE COULD GAIN THE CONSENT OF THE 
OWNER 
3. IF HE/SHE WAS PRESENT. REF THE UTAH CODE. - I BELIEVED THE 
TRAILER WAS TO BE ABANDONED 
4. AND I BELIEVED I COULD GAIN CONSENT FROM THE OWNER OF THE 
PROPERTY IT WAS 
5. SETTING ON. PAGE 3 LINE 23 & 24. 
6. PARAGRAPH THREE PART FOUR-EDUCATION 
7. I COMPLETED MY HIGH SCHOOL CREDITS AND RECEIVED A G.E.D. WHILE 
IN 0. & A.. I SPENT 
8. FOUR QUARTERS AT SALT LAKE COMMUNITY COLLEGE AND I CAN PROVIDE 
DOCUMENTATION 
9. TO VERIFY. 
10. ORGANIZATIONAL OR COMMUNITY AFFILIATIONS 
11. I AM AN ORGANIZED INDIVIDUAL. IF YOU SEE ME STANDING IN THE 
COMMUNITY. I 
12. AM A "PILLAR" OF IT. PEOPLE AFFILIATE AND/OR ASSOCIATE 
THEMSELVES WITH ME 
13. OFTEN AND FOR SELF BETTERMENT. I AM INVOLVED. WHAT DO I GET FOR 
14. FURTHER JOINING ? I SHOULD GET PAID. 
15. PAGE ELEVEN 
16. PARAGRAPH ONE A. 
17. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT MY SPLEEN COULD HAVE BEEN SAVED. I WAS IN 
JAIL. I ASKED A JAILER 
18. THREE TIMES TO LET ME RECEIVE MEDICAL ATTENTION, I DID SO ONLY 
AFTER I WAS ABSOLUTELY 
19. CERTAIN THAT I WAS BLEEDING INTERNALLY AND I TOLD HIM 
SPECIFICALLY THAT. 
20. MY MOTHER CALLED THE JAIL ELEVEN TIMES AND TOLD THEM I NEEDED 
MEDICAL 
21. ATTENTION. THE JAILER TOLD ME TO JUST LAY DOWN AND I WOULD BE 
OKAY. AFTER 
22. A FULL NIGHT AND DAY OF EXCRUCIATING PAIN I WAS TAKEN TO A 
MEDIC WHO TOLD ME 
23. I HAD SORE STOMACH MUSCLES AND TO JUST "GO LAY DOWN AND YOU'LL 
BE OKAY". FINALLY 
24. AT SIX O'CLOCK THAT EVENING I WAS RELEASED. MY MOTHER TOOK ME 
TO L.D.S. HOSPITAL 
25. AND I WAS TAKEN INTO SURGERY. MY SPLEEN WAS REMOVED AND MY 
LIVER WAS STITCHED 
26. BACK TOGETHER. THEY DRAINED OVER FOUR PINTS OF PARTIALLY 
COAGULATED BLOOD OUT OF 
27. MY BODY CAVITY. PAGE 2 & 3 LINE 26&27 & 1-10 PAGE 6 LINE 18 & 
ft n A 1 o 1 
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1. PARAGRAPH TWO B. 
2. NO. NOT "COMPELLED TO ABIDE". I COULDN'T BREATH OR THINK 
CLEARLY. I COULDN'T, AT 
3. THE TIME. UNDERSTAND WHY I COULDN'T FLEE. THIS GUY KNEW WHERE I 
LIVED AND 
4. HE WAS TRYING TO GAIN THE LICENSE TO BEAT AND OR KILL ME IF I 
WOULD HAVE DONE 
5. ANYTHING THAT WOULD MAKE HIM BELIEVE I KNEW ANYTHING BUT A 
POSITIVE WORLD, HE, 
6. I BELIEVE, WOULD HAVE HARMED OR KILLED ME. PAGE 4 LINE 1-6. 
PAGE 5 LINE 10 & 11. 
7. PARAGRAPH THREE C. 
8. IT WAS THREE YOUNG MEN - IT WAS 1986 WHEN I CUT MY WRISTS AND 
9. IT WAS 1989 WHEN I DRANK THE DRAINO BOTH TIMES BECAUSE I WAS IN 
FEAR 
10. OF BEING CONFINED. 
11. PARAGRAPH FOUR A. 
12. MY DRINKING DIDN'T INCREASE IT JUST BECAME REGULAR. - I DRINK 
HARD ALCOHOL 
13. AND BEER AND/OR WINE - ONE HALF GALLON EVERY TWO WEEKENDS OR 
LONGER. 
14. PAGE TWELVE 
15. PARAGRAPH ONE B. 
16. I HAVEN'T SMOKED POT SINCE 0. & A., 1989. REGULARLY. HAVEN'T 
SMOKED POT AT ALL FOR 
17. THE LAST FIVE YEARS. SINCE 1989. 
18. PART C. 
19. I DO NEED HELP. I NEED TO RID MYSELF OF WHOEVER OR WHATEVER IT 
IS THAT USES 
20. SUBSTANCE USE AS AN EXCUSE TO BE AND/OR MAKE PROBLEMS FOR ME. 
21. EMPLOYMENT HISTORY 
22. I WAS FIRED FROM PARKWEST FOR TAKING A WEEK OFF - WITHOUT 
PREARRANGEMENT 
23. AFTER MY BROTHER DIED. PAGE 7 LINE 19 & 20. 
24. PAGE THIRTEEN 
2 5. PARAGRAPH ONE 
26. I WAS EMPLOYED AT LABOR EXPRESS AT THE TIME. I HAD BROKEN MY 
FOOT IN DECEMBER 
27. AND HAD BEEN UNABLE TO WORK REGULARLY. 
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1. EVALUATIVE SUMMARY 
2. PARAGRAPH ONE 
3. I DID NOT TAKE A TRAILER. I WAS NOT A PART OF ITS TAKING. 
"THEY" NO. "HE". JOHN 
4. REMINGTON DROVE. "THEY" NO "HE" JOE BROILER SOLD AN ITEM. NOT 
"INTOXICATED" 
5. "SUFFOCATED" JOHN TOOK DOMINION OVER ME AND IT WAS ALMOST 
IMPOSSIBLE 
6. FOR ME TO BREATH AT ALL. PAGE 3 LINE 22&23, PAGE 4 LINE 4 & 5 
PAGE 5 LINE 9 & 10, PAGE 4 LINE 3, PAGE 9 LINE 2 - 6 . 
7. PARAGRAPH TWO 
8. I ACCEPT NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR MY INVOLVEMENT. IF I WOULD HAVE 
TRIED TO LEAVE 
9. THE SITUATION, I BELIEVE BEYOND A SHADOW OF A DOUBT, JOHN 
REMINGTON WOULD HAVE HARMED 
10. AND / OR KILLED ME. I WASN'T "ABIDING" OR "GOING ALONG". (AND I 
DIDN'T SAY ANYTHING LIKE THAT) 
11. I WAS CAREFULLY WAITING FOR AN OPPORTUNITY TO PART COMPANY WITH 
JOHN REMINGTON 
12. WITHOUT MAKING HIM SUSPICIOUS. I DID NOT BELIEVE THE CRIME OF 
THEFT WAS BEING 
13. COMMITTED, EXCEPT (AND ACCEPT) THE THEFT OF MYSELF, MY BODY, 
WHICH WAS TAKEN WITHOUT 
14. LICENSE AND PLACED UNDER EXTREME PRESSURE, SO EXTREME THAT MY 
HEALTH (MY LIFE), 
15. WAS AT SEVERE RISK FOR THE DURATION OF HIS PRESENCE ON ME, ALSO 
WITHOUT LICENSE. 
16. I DON'T MIND FULL TIME EMPLOYMENT. I JUST MIND PEOPLE TELLING 
ME COERCING ME, AND TRYING 
17. TO MANIPULATE ME INTO DOING SOMETHING I ALREADY KNOW HOW TO DO. 
- ALCOHOL ABUSE, I AM 
18. ABUSED FOR IT, NOT FROM ITS USE. I MAY ABUSE IT ! - I AM GOOD, 
BETTER THAN AVERAGE REGULARLY, 
19. AND I MAKE PEOPLE BETTER WHEN THEY ARE INFLUENCED BY ME. MAY BE 
THAT IT IS 
20. CRIMINAL AND IT MAY BE THAT I AM IN ERROR TO THINK I WILL BE 
GOOD AND 
21. GET BETTER JUST LIKE EVERYONE ELSE, THAT IS/ARE, "REALLY 
ALIVE". AND COGNITIVE 
22. STRUCTURING ... I'M NOT TOTALLY CERTAIN, BUT THERE IS A METHOD 
TO MY 
23. MADNESS AND I DO BUILD SOMETHING THAT LASTS ! - OTHERS TAKE 
CARE OF MY 
24. FINANCIAL NEEDS AND HAVE ALLEVIATED ME OF THE RESPONSIBILITY 
AND ACTIVE 
25. CAPABILITY TO DO SO FOR THEIR OWN REASONS. 
26. PAGE FOURTEEN 
27. PARAGRAPH ONE NEXT PAGE 
fthfilQI 
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PAGE 14 PARAGRAPH 1 PRESENTENCE CONT. 
I AM A GOOD PERSON AND AM KNOWN AS A GOOD PERSON. WE AS SOCIETY 
AND HUMANITY 
BELIEVE, TRY TO BELIEVE, AND TRY TO MAKE BELIEVE THAT THE ONLY 
PEOPLE WHO 
ARE "OFFENDERS", "CONVICTS", ARE BAD, WRONG, MISTAKEN, AND 
CRIMINAL. 
CONSEQUENTLY, IT IS , AND HAS BEEN, ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE FOR ME TO 
HAVE ENOUGH 
LIBERTY TO EVEN PARTIALLY COMPLY WITH THE COURTS SYSTEM AS AN 
"OFFENDER" OR "CONVICT". I AM NOT BAD, WRONG, MISTAKEN, NOR AM 
I CRIMINAL. A MAJORITY CANT BELIEVE THAT I NEED TO COMPLY 
WITH THE COURTS SYSTEM. I'M GOOD ! A SMALL MINORITY WE DARE NOT 
EXIST AS BY KNOWING OF ITS NEGATIVE EXISTENCE WOULD LIKE ME IN 
MORE TROUBLE BECAUSE I AM GOOD ! 
AGENCY RECOMMENDATION 
IT CAN NOT BE RESPECTFULLY RECOMMENDED THAT I BE COMMITTED TO 
(SENT, PLACED IN) THE UTAH STATE PRISON OR ANY OTHER LIKE 
FACILITY BY ANY ONE 
OR NUMBER FOR ANY AMOUNT OF TIME, THAT ANY ONE OR NUMBER MUST 
AND 
MOST CERTAINLY WILL BE RESPECTLESS ! 
I DID NOT COMMIT A CRIME. I AM A CIVIL, NONVIOLENT, HEALTHY, 
CONTRIBUTIVE PART OF SOCIETY AND HUMANITY. 
1. NO ! NOT EVEN ANY KIND OF CENT OR PENNY NO NOT EVEN ONE ! 
2. NO ! RESTITUTION IS OWED TO ME IN AN INNUMERABLE AMOUNT ! 
3. NO ! I WAS NOT EFFECTIVELY, LEGALLY, DEFENDED. 
THERE IS NO RESPECT DESERVED IN THIS SUBMISSION AND THE 
APPROVAL MAY NOT BE REAL NOT FROM A RESPECTABLE, RESPONSIBLE, 
INDIVIDUAL ! 
P.S. AP&P MISSED ARREST SEPTEMBER 1993 IMPROPER LICENSE PLATE. 
WARRANT 
FOR PUBLIC INTOX. PAGE 3 LINE 11&12&13. STAYED OVER NIGHT IN 
KAYSVILLE DAVIS 
COUNTY JAIL, MADE BAIL AND PAYED FINE. 
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1. DEAR PEOPLE INVOLVED ( THE HONORABLE PAT BRIAN, THE HONORABLE 
ANNE STIRBA, STAFF OF THIRD DISTRICT 
2. COURT, AND ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE, GOVERNOR MIKE LEAVITT, 
PRESIDENT BILL CLINTON, THE F.B.I. AND 
3. ITS DIRECTOR LOUIS FRESH, THE C.I.A. AND ITS DIRECTOR R.JAMES 
WOOLSEY, SENATOR ORRIN 
4. HATCH, MAYOR DIDI CORRADINI, AND NOW FINALLY THE UTAH SUPREME 
COURT AND THE UNITED 
5. STATES SUPREME COURT.) 
6. WE HAVE ALL BEEN PLAYED FOR A FOOL. I LOOK THE MOST FOOLISH OF 
ALL BECAUSE I'M THE ONE IN PRISON. 
7. I'VE WRITTEN SOME THINGS TO SOME OF YOU THAT COULD BE 
INTERPRETED AS RASH OR EVEN THREATENING, 
8. (JACK FORD FOR GOV. LEAVITT - "TERSE" ?!?) I WROTE TO GET YOUR 
ATTENTION. I DIDN'T COMMIT A CRIME, 
9. NOT THIS TIME, NO WAY ! IT IS MORE DIFFICULT THAN ONE MIGHT 
THINK TO SIT IDLE, TRAPPED WHILE 
10. SOMEONE IS CHEATING YOU. I HAVE ALWAYS BELIEVED IN THE SYSTEM. 
I BELIEVE IT IS FAIR AND THAT IT 
11. DOES WORK. I HAVE A PAST. WHEN I LOOK BACK ON IT I DON'T THINK 
I'VE BEEN THAT BAD, BUT 
12. ON PAPER IT SAYS I HAVE TWENTY EIGHT PRIORS, NOT ALL OF THEM 
ARRESTS, FOUR OF THEM ARE FROM 
13. THIS CURRENT OFFENSE, AND A FIFTH DIRECTLY RELATES TO AND IS A 
PART OF THE CAUSE OF THIS LAST EVENT. 
14. REF. PG. 3 LN 14-27, PG.4 LN 1-27, PG. 5 LN 1-13, PG. 6 LN 
20-27, PG. 8 LN 1-5, PG 9 LN 2-6, PG. 10 LN 3-15. CERTAIN 
15. RECORDS JUST DON'T EXIST (TYPE "0"S COMPUTER ERRORS) PG. 2 LN. 
5 PG. 5 LN. 23, PG. 6 LN. 5,6 & 8,9 & 11, 12. IN SOME 
16. INSTANCES I'VE HAD A TICKET AND FAILED TO PAY OR TAKE CLASSES 
AND HAD TO BE BACK AND PAY FOR IT OR DO IT AGAIN. 
17. PG. 1 LN. 6, PG. 5 LN 17 & 18, PG. 1 LN. 8 & 9, PG. 5 LN. 19 & 
20, PG. 1 LN. 13, 14, 15, PG. 5 LN. 22 & 23, PG. 2 LN. 2, 3 & 
8, PG. 3 LN. 8, 12, 13, 21 & 22. AND 
18. OTHER THINGS I'VE JUST PLAIN DONE. SOMETIMES WE DON'T KNOW WHY 
AND SOMETIMES WE DO BUT EITHER 
19. WAY WE'VE JUST DONE IT. 
20. WELL HERE IS WHAT I'VE DONE. I DON'T THINK ANYONE WILL BELIEVE 
IT WARRANTS PRISON TIME. 
21. WHEN I WAS THIRTEEN YEARS OLD I WAS COASTING MY MOTORCYCLE, 
WHICH I HAD BOUGHT WITH MY OWN MONEY 
22. FROM A PAPER ROUTE. I WAS ON A PUBLIC ROAD AND I WAS STOPPED 
AND CITED. REF. PG. 1 LN. 1. 
23. I STARTED DRINKING AND SMOKING POT AT AGE TWELVE. (I WASN'T 
HURTING ANOTHER) BY THE AGE OF FIFTEEN I 
24. DRANK AND SMOKED POT REGULARLY. I ALWAYS HAD A GOOD TIME. I 
NEVER GOT IN FIGHTS AND I ALWAYS 
25. STAYED WITHIN MY LIMITS. (NEVER GOT SLOPPY OR OUT OF CONTROL) I 
ALSO PAID FOR MY OWN HABITS. I 
26. WORKED FULL TIME SUMMER AND PART TIME WINTER. AT A PARTY 
DURING SCHOOL SOMEONE UNINVITED 
27. CALLED THE SCHOOL AND THE PROPER AUTHORITIES WERE NOTIFIED. I 
WAS TAKEN IN AND CITED. PG. 1 LN. 2. 
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1. TWO MONTHS AFTER I GOT MY DRIVERS LICENSE I HIT ANOTHER CAR. I 
PANICKED AND DROVE AWAY. PG. 1 LN 4 & 5, 
2. PG. 5 LN. 15 & 16. 
3. I WAS SIXTEEN YEARS OLD I WAS AS BIG AS MANY MEN. I HAD WORKED 
REGULARLY SINCE I WAS ELEVEN 
4. YEARS OLD AND I DIDN'T FEEL LIKE I "HAD" TO STAY ANYWHERE I 
WASN'T GETTING PAID. PG. 1 LN. 6, PG. 5 LN. 17 & 18. 
5. THE SPRING OF THAT YEAR (1986) I MET A MAN NAMED MIKE G. 
ROMNEY. HE PROMISED ME A CAREER IN THE MODELING 
6. INDUSTRY THAT I WOULD ONLY NEED TO SUBSIDIZE WITH A PART TIME 
JOB. HE TRIED TO PUSH MY BUTTONS ABOUT 
7. SMOKING POT AND DRINKING. I THINK HE USED ME AS A SCAPEGOAT OR 
DEGRADED ME TO OTHERS, BECAUSE AFTER 
8. MY ASSOCIATIONS WITH HIM, MY LIFE AND MY REPUTATION AS A VERY 
GOOD PERSON BEGAN TO CHANGE AND 
9. THINGS THAT HAD COME TO ME EASY BECAME DIFFICULT. 
10. ONE WEEK AFTER MY LICENSE WAS TO BE REINSTATED I GOT A TRAFFIC 
TICKET ON THE WAY TO WORK. PG. 1 LN. 7. 
11. I HAD, SINCE THE AGE OF FOURTEEN, WENT TO THE GYM REGULARLY. 
ONE EVENING AFTER WORKING OUT A FRIEND AND 
12. I WERE DRINKING A BEER IN HIS CAR. A PATROLMAN PULLED UP AND 
CITED US BOTH FOR OPEN CONTAINER. PG. 1 LN. 8 & 9, PG. 5 LN. 19 
& 20. 
13. STOPPED FOR SPEEDING WITH A COOLER FULL OF BEER AND A FEW UNDER 
THE "BELT", I AND TWO OTHERS 
14. WERE CITED AND RELEASED. PG. 1 LN. 10, 11 & 12. 
15. I HAD JUST RETURNED FROM FOUR MONTHS OF SCHOOL IN CALIFORNIA. 
MY BEST FRIEND AND I WERE OUT DRINKING 
16. AND STUNT DRIVING ON SNOWY BACK ROADS OF A RURAL AREA IN LOGAN. 
PG. 1 LN. 13, 14 & 15. PG. 5 LN. 22 & 23. 
17. I GOT A CRAZY IDEA AND I HAD A LOT OF CRAZY IDEAS AT THAT TIME 
IN MY LIFE. I WAS A BIG, ACTIVE, GOOD LOOKING, 
18. YOUNG MAN AND IT SEEMED THE ANSWER TO MY EVERY MENTAL QUESTION, 
WAS ADVENTUROUS AND/OR ILLEGAL. I DID 
19. SOMETHING I REGRETTED. I ROBBED A GAS STATION AND I GOT CAUGHT. 
I ADMITTED MY ERROR, DID MY TIME AND 
20. I DIDN'T TAKE ANY OF IT AS A JOKE. I HAVE HONESTLY ENDEAVORED 
TO STAY AWAY FROM ANY AND ALL CRIME (EXCEPT 
21. DRINKING BEFORE AGE 21 SMOKING POT) EVER SINCE AND ALL OF MY 
LIFE BEFORE THAT EVENT. PG. 1 LN. 16-20, PG. 5 LN. 25, 26 & 27. 
22. ON MY WAY HOME FROM A BAR, DRUNK, I SAW A PATROL CAR. I RAN, I 
WAS CAUGHT AND I PAID. PG.l LN. 21, 22 & 23, PG. 6 LN. 2 & 3 
23. I WAS FINALLY OF LEGAL AGE TO DRINK AND I WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN 
TAKEN IN BUT I HAD A WARRANT FOR TRAFFIC AND 
24. ANOTHER FOR NO BUSINESS LICENSE. PG. 1 LN. 27, PG. 2 LN. 1-6, 
PG. 6 LN. 4, 5 & 6. 
25. AGAIN I WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN TAKEN IN IF NOT FOR UNPAID TRAFFIC 
TICKETS. WHILE IN JAIL I WAS ASSAULTED 
26. BY SEVERAL GUARDS. I ASKED TO MAKE A PHONE CALL AND THEY 
ANSWERED ME BY TELLING ME TO "SHUT UP AND GO 
27. TO SLEEP". IT WAS FOUR O'CLOCK IN THE AFTERNOON AND I HAD BEEN 
TOLD BY PRETRIAL THAT I WOULD BE 
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1. ALLOWED TO MAKE A PHONE CALL. SO I ENQUIRED SEVERAL TIMES AND 
FINALLY THEY CAME INTO THE CELL FORCED ME TO THE 
2. GROUND FORCIBLY REMOVED MY JACKET AND SHOES PULLING MUSCLES IN 
MY SHOULDERS AND LEGS LEAVING ME IN 
3. PAIN FOR WELL OVER A WEEK. PG. 2 LN. 7,8 & 9. 
4. I WAS ASSAULTED AND ILLEGALLY ARRESTED IN MY OWN APARTMENT FOR 
TELLING TWO OFFICERS NOT TO WAKE 
5. MY NEIGHBORS AT TWO O'CLOCK IN THE MORNING. I WAS TOLD BY 
PUBLIC DEFENDER BOB STEELE IT WOULD 
6. BE TO HARD TO FIGHT THE CHARGES. BECAUSE I HAD BEEN DRINKING 
EARLIER THE EVENING OF THE INCIDENT. I 
7. AGREED TO PLEAD GUILTY TO PUBLIC INTOX. PAY A FIFTY DOLLAR 
FINE, AND WALK AWAY. PG. 2 LN. 10-17 PG. 6 LN. 8, 9 & 10. 
8. I WAS COMMITTED TO SALT LAKE COUNTY JAIL FOR NINETY DAYS. I 
DIDN'T THINK I HAD DONE THAT POORLY ON 
9. PROBATION. I DID GO TO MOST OF MY MEETINGS. PG. 2 LN. 18. 19 
& 20, PG. 6 LN. 12, 13 & 14, PG. 1 LN. 23 & 24. 
10. I WAS DRUNK AND I WAS BEING COERCED INTO DOING SOMETHING THAT 
EMBARRASSES ME STILL. I THINK THE 
11. STORE SECURITY OFFICER COUNTED ON ME BEING EMBARRASSED AND 
BELIEVED I WOULDN'T MAKE AN ISSUE 
12. OF HIM ASSAULTING ME AND THEN CHARGING ME WITH ASSAULT, I WAS 
TOLD BY A PUBLIC DEFENDER THAT I WOULD 
13. BE PLEADING GUILTY TO ONLY RETAIL THEFT. PG. 2 LN. 21-25, PG. 6 
LN 15, 16 & 17. 
14. DRINKING OUT AT THE POOL I EXCHANGED SOME WORDS WITH SOMEONE 
AND SHORTLY LATER I WAS BEATEN. 
15. ALTHOUGH I WAS BADLY INJURED I WAS STILL TAKEN TO JAIL. AFTER 
TWENTY FOUR HOURS AND A NUMBER OF 
16. REQUESTS, BY MY MOTHER AND BY MYSELF, TO RECEIVE MEDICAL 
ATTENTION, I WAS FINALLY RELEASED FROM 
17. CUSTODY. I WENT IMMEDIATELY TO THE HOSPITAL AND I WAS TAKEN 
INTO SURGERY. PG.2 LN.26 & 27, PG. 3 LN. 1-10, 
18. PG.. 6 LN. 18 & 19, PG. 8 LN. 17-27. 
19. I HAD A DATE AND I WAITED TOO LONG TO FIND OUT WHY SHE DIDN'T 
SHOW UP. I STARTED KNOCKING, SHE DIDN'T ANSWER 
20. BUT I CONTINUED TO KNOCK BECAUSE I DIDN'T DESERVE TO BE TREATED 
LIKE THAT. THE POLICE SHOWED UP AND TOOK ME IN 
21. FOR A WARRANT. PG. 3 LN. 11, 12 & 13. 
22. FOUR MONTHS AFTER THE PREVIOUS INCIDENT I WAS STOPPED FOR 
EXPIRED PLATES. I STILL HAD THE OUTSTANDING 
23. WARRANT FROM THE PREVIOUS INCIDENT WHICH I HAD THOUGHT I'D 
PAID. I MADE BAIL THE NEXT DAY. I DID GO TO PAY THIS 
24. FINE AND I WAS TOLD THAT IT WAS ALREADY PAID. PG. 11 LN 24, 25 
& 26. 
25. AT A BAR I FREQUENTED, A GIRL NAMED TRACY, I HAD RECENTLY HAD 
SEX WITH (AND GIVEN $150.00 DOLLARS 
26. TO UPON HER REQUEST TO "TAKE CARE OF" ALLEGED PREGNANCY) TOLD 
ME SHE WAS PREGNANT. I TOLD HER NOT 
27. ANOTHER DIME AND TOOK A SEAT WITH A FRIEND. SHORTLY LATER I 
WAS ASKED TO LEAVE THE BAR. I DID 
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1. AND WAS WAITING IN MY FRIENDS TRUCK WHEN THE POLICE SHOWED UP. 
PG. 3 LN. 14-21, PG. 6 LN. 20, 21 & 22. 
2. I HAD MEET JOHN REMINGTON A COUPLE OF WEEKS BEFORE THE PREVIOUS 
INCIDENT TOOK PLACE. WE MET AT A PARTY 
3. WHERE I WAS TOLD THAT HE WAS JOHN THAXTON. MY SISTER HAD TOLD 
ME ABOUT HER FRIEND JOHN THAXTON. 
4. SHE TOLD ME HE WAS A REALLY NEAT MORMON GUY THAT SHE LIKED AND 
SHE TOLD ME HE WAS 
5. INVOLVED IN DRAMA IN SCHOOL. THE NEXT TIME SHE SPOKE OF HIM WAS 
TO TELL ME THAT HE HAD BEEN IN 
6. A CAR ACCIDENT, SOME DRINKING HAD BEEN INVOLVED, AND HIS GIRL 
FRIEND HAD BEEN KILLED. THE THIRD TIME 
7. SHE MENTIONED HIM TO ME SHE TOLD ME THAT HE HAD A LITTLE SISTER 
NAMED TRACY THAT I WOULD LIKE. 
8. WHEN THE FOLLOWING EVENTS TOOK PLACE I DIDN'T MAKE THE 
CONNECTION BETWEEN JOHN AND THE TRACY I 
9. GAVE THE MONEY TO IN THE PREVIOUS INCIDENT. 
10. JOHN REMINGTON CAUGHT ME AT MY APARTMENT. I HAD BEEN TRYING TO 
AVOID HIM. HE HAD APPROACHED 
11. ME EARLIER THAT WEEK. HE HAD JUST BEEN RELEASED FROM JAIL FOR 
SOMETHING HE CLAIMED HE DIDN'T' DO. 
12. I GAVE HIM BUS FARE AND WE TOOK THE BUS TO HIS PARENTS HOUSE. 
FROM THERE HE GAVE ME A RIDE TO 
13. MY APARTMENT. ON THE WAY TO, AND AT MY APARTMENT JOHN 
SUGGESTED "WE" BE INVOLVED IN SOME 
14. CRIMINAL ACTIVITY. HE SAID "WE" SHOULD DEAL COCAINE AND HE 
TOLD ME HE WOULD COME AND GET ME 
15. THE FOLLOWING DAY. I DIDN'T WANT TO GET IN ANY TROUBLE SO I 
MADE MYSELF SCARCE THE NEXT DAY. I HOPED 
16. HE WOULD GET THE HINT. HE DIDN'T. A FRIEND OF MINE WAS THERE 
HE WAS JUST MOVING IN. WE HAD BEEN 
17. NEIGHBORS BEFORE, HE WAS STARTING COLLEGE AND MY PLACE WAS 
CLOSE TO THE SCHOOL, SO I AGREED TO LET 
18. HIM STAY AND SHARE IN LIVING EXPENSES. 
19. WHEN JOHN SHOWED UP HE DIDN'T COME RIGHT TO THE DOOR. FIRST HE 
HOOKED UP MY CABLE AT THE OUTSIDE 
20. BOX. THEN HE CAME TO THE DOOR AND TOLD ME THAT I NOW HAD 
CABLE, AS HE FINISHED THE ADJUSTMENTS. 
21. HE DIDN'T ASK AND HE DIDN'T ALLOW ME ANY TIME TO RESPOND. HE 
THEN SAID WE "NEED" SOMETHING TO DRINK. 
22. HE BOUGHT A BOTTLE OF VODKA AND SOME O.J. AND GOT ME AND MY 
FRIEND DRUNK. THEN HE SAID LETS 
23. GO , WHEN I ASKED WHY? AND WHERE? HE SAID HE NEEDED TO GO GET 
SOME MONEY. HE DROVE (I WAS 
24. THE PASSENGER) TO AN APARTMENT COMPLEX WAY OUT PAST FASHION 
PLACE MALL. HE WENT INSIDE 
25 A BUILDING CAME BACK OUT AND DROVE TO ANOTHER PART OF THE 
COMPLEX WHERE SEVERAL TRAILERS WERE 
26. PARKED. HE GOT OUT OPENED ONE CHECKED THE CONTENTS AND SAID 
"WE'RE TAKING IT", HE BACKED 
27. HIS TRUCK UP AND THEN HE HOOKED THE TRAILER TO HIS BUMPER. I 
BELIEVED THE TRAILER WAS HIS. 
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1. I DIDN'T ASSIST HIM BECAUSE: A. I DIDN'T WANT TO GET MY CLOTHES 
DIRTY. AND B. I COULDN'T. 
2. HE WAS GOING TOO FAST. HE WAS JUST LIKE AN EXHAUSTING LITTLE 
KID. I COULDN'T BREATH OR THINK 
3. CLEARLY AND HE IS/WAS SIMPLY TO BIG TO GRAB AND STOP. FURTHER 
MORE HE'S NOT MY CHILD. 
4. WHEN HE BEGAN TO PULL OUT, THE TRAILER HIT SOMETHING. THIS 
ANGERED JOHN. HE BEGAN DRIVING 
5. TOO FAST BEFORE WE WERE EVEN OUT OF THE COMPLEX PARKING LOT. 
HE CONTINUED TO DRIVE AT HIGH SPEED 
6. AND DANGEROUSLY. HE DROVE DOWN A DIRT ROAD THAT WAS IN POOR 
CONDITION (TOO FAST) CRASHING THROUGH A 
7. GATE AND EVENTUALLY BACKING IT INTO A STORAGE BAY DOOR. HE 
UNHOOKED IT FROM HIS TRUCK. THEN HE CRAWLED 
8. INSIDE AND TOOK SOME THINGS OUT (AGAIN I DID BELIEVE IT WAS HIS 
PROPERTY) AND PUT THEM IN HIS TRUCK. I 
9. WANTED TO LEAVE THE SITUATION. HIS ACTIONS HAD BECOME 
STARTLINGLY AGGRESSIVE BUT WHEN I CONSIDERED 
10. LEAVING I BE CAME CONCERNED THAT I WOULD BE INJURED OR EVEN 
KILLED SO I JUST GOT BACK IN THE TRUCK. 
11. HE THEN DROVE TO THE OTHER SIDE OF THE CITY WHERE HE SOLD THE 
ITEMS HE HAD TAKEN 
12. OUT OF THE TRAILER TO SOMEONE HE KNEW. AFTER THIS HE TOOK ME 
OUT TO A BAR WHERE 
13. HE TOLD EVERYONE HOW "WE" HAD STOLEN THIS BIG TRAILER. I WAS 
TRAPPED AND I COULDN'T 
14. GET AWAY. HE NEVER LET ME OUT OF HIS SIGHT. I DIDN'T WANT TO 
BELIEVE WHAT WAS HAPPENING 
15. WAS HAPPENING BECAUSE I DIDN'T WANT IT TO BE BELIEVED THAT I 
HAD LICENSED ANY OF IT TO OCCUR, 
16. BECAUSE I HADN'T, AND HE WAS PUSHING ME VERY HARD TO BUY INTO 
IT. HE INVITED HIMSELF TO STAY 
17. THE NIGHT AT MY PLACE. IN THE MORNING, BECAUSE I WAS GOING NO 
WHERE WITHOUT HIM, (I DIDN'T 
18. LIKE THE IDEA OF LETTING HIM HAVE MY PLACE) I HAD HIM TAKE ME 
TO THE POST OFFICE TO PICK UP A 
19. CHECK I RECEIVED WEEKLY FROM MY PARENTS. I CASHED IT, BOUGHT 
BREAKFAST, AND A COLD CASE OF BEER 
20. AND WE RETURNED TO MY APARTMENT WHICH IS WHERE I INTENDED TO 
STAY UNTIL HE WENT AWAY. 
21. WHEN WE WERE RETURNING TO MY APARTMENT, JOHN SAID WE SHOULD 
TAKE A TRAILER THAT WAS PARKED 
22. IN THE PARKING LOT OF MY APARTMENT COMPLEX. I TOLD HIM NO. HE 
INSISTED THAT "WE" SHOULD TAKE 
23. IT. I SUCCEEDED IN AGREEING TO GO TAKE A LOOK AT IT. WHEN 
INSPECTING IT I FOUND THAT THE OUT OF 
24. STATE TEMPORARY LICENSE PLATE HAD EXPIRED AND THERE WERE 
SEVERAL STICKERS ON THE TRAILER 
25. STATING THAT IT WAS IMPROPERLY PARKED AND NEEDED TO BE MOVED OR 
IT WOULD BE TOWED AT 
26. THE OWNERS' EXPENSE. JOHN WANTED TO JUST TAKE IT HE INSISTED 
THAT "WE" SHOULD 
27. JUST TAKE IT. I FINALLY GOT HIM INTO MY APARTMENT WHERE HE 
CONTINUED TO 
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1. INSIST WE SHOULD JUST TAKE IT EVEN AFTER I HAD TOLD HIM NO. AS 
NOON TURNED IN TO AFTERNOON 
2. I HOPED THAT I HAD CONVINCED JOHN TO NOT JUST TAKE IT. I TOLD 
HIM THAT THE TRAILER WAS 
3. PROBABLY ABANDONED AND THE FOLLOWING DAY I WOULD GO TALK TO THE 
MANAGER OF THE COMPLEX. IF 
4. IT WAS TRULY ABANDONED AND THE MANAGER OF THE COMPLEX DIDN'T 
MIND THEN WE WOULD TAKE IT. 
5. I WAS TIRED OF JOHN REMINGTON. I WAS TRULY AT HIS MERCY AND I 
DIDN'T KNOW WHAT TO DO. 
6. BY LATE AFTERNOON HE ONCE AGAIN HAD BEGAN INSISTING THAT WE GO 
AND JUST TAKE THE TRAILER. 
7. MY FRIEND SUGGESTED WE GO TO A BAR AND PICK UP A GIRL THAT 
WORKED THERE WHO WAS GETTING OFF AT 
8. SIX O'CLOCK. MY FRIEND HAD A TAB THERE, THE GIRL WAS CUTE AND 
I BELIEVED THE DISTRACTION WOULD 
9. MAKE HIM (JOHN) STOP! BUT ON THE WAY OUT OF THE COMPLEX JOHN 
STOPPED HIS TRUCK BACKED UP TO THE 
10. TRAILER AND CHAINED IT TO THE BUMPER OF HIS TRUCK. I GOT OUT 
OF THE TRUCK TO LEAVE BUT I 
11. COULDN'T AND I DON'T KNOW WHY ! I GOT BACK IN THE TRUCK I FELT 
FRAIL AND WEAK. MY MOVEMENTS 
12. WERE SLOW AND AWKWARD MY WHOLE BODY ACHED. (AND I HADN'T BEEN 
THAT WAY BEFORE!) I DIDN'T REALLY 
13. KNOW WHY I WAS GOING ANYWHERE WITH HIM. WHEN WE REACHED THE 
BAR I NO LONGER REALLY KNEW WHAT 
14. WAS GOING ON I JUST WANDERED AROUND THE VICINITY OF THE VEHICLE 
I HAD CAME IN WHILE JOHN 
15. SHOT HIS BIG MOUTH OFF. AFTER JOHN HAD GOT THE LOCK CUT OFF 
AND SUCCESSFULLY MADE A LOT OF 
16. NOISE WE ALL GOT BACK IN THE TRUCK AND JOHN PROCEEDED TO 
TERRORIZE MOST BY DRIVING WELL 
17. OVER THE SPEED LIMIT, RUNNING RED LIGHTS, WITH THE JACK OF THE 
TRAILER DRAGGING AGAINST 
18. THE GROUND. THE CHAIN BROKE AND THE TRAILER SLID TO THE SIDE 
OF THE ROAD. JOHN TURNED THE 
19. TRUCK AROUND AND WENT BACK TO THE TRAILER. WHEN THE POLICE 
SHOWED UP I DIDN'T FLEE. 
20. IN FACT I WAS RELIEVED. I KNEW I WOULD BE GOING HOME SOON., THE 
ENTIRE TIME I HAD SPENT 
21. WITH JOHN REMINGTON HAD BEEN AN ORDEAL AND I WAS GLAD THAT IT 
WAS OVER. I WAS TAKEN 
22. IN AND QUESTIONED. I TOLD THE POLICE THAT I BELIEVED THE 
TRAILER WAS ABANDONED AND THE 
23. REASON I DIDN'T ASSIST JOHN WAS BECAUSE I HAD TOLD HIM TO WAIT 
UNTIL THE FOLLOWING DAY 
24. WHEN I COULD GET PERMISSION. I WAS DISTRAUGHT STILL AND I EVEN 
TRIED TO FIND SOME WAY 
25. THAT I DID ASSIST BUT I SIMPLY DID NOT HELP TAKE OR TAKE ANY 
THING. A. I COULDN'T I 
26. WAS BARELY CAPABLE OF STAYING ON MY FEET AND IT WAS NOT BECAUSE 
OF ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION. 
27. B. I HAD NO DESIRE TO TAKE IT. I DIDN'T WANT THE TRAILER(S) OR 
ANYTHING IN IT (THEM). 
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I HAD MONEY IN MY POCKET AND A LEGITIMATE SOURCE OF INCOME 
THROUGH SEVERAL TEMPORARY SERVICES 
EVERY MORNING I WANTED TO SHOW UP. C. I HAD JUST HOOKED UP WITH 
AN OLD FRIEND WHO WAS 
STRAIGHTENING HIS "ACT" UP AND WE HAD ALWAYS HAD FUN TOGETHER 
WITHOUT BREAKING THE 
LAW. D. I DON'T WANT ANY PART OF CRIME I HAVEN'T SINCE I WAS 
A TEENAGER. PERIOD. 
I WAS TAKEN TO SALT LAKE COUNTY JAIL. I WAS TOLD BY THE 
OFFICERS WHO WERE TAKING 
ME THERE THAT I WOULDN'T BE CHARGED WITH THEFT. NOW I AM IN 
PRISON. PG.3 LN. 14-27, 
PG. 4 LN. 1-27, PG. 9 LN. 2-6, PG. 10 LN. 3-6, 8-15. 
IN CONCLUSION, JOHN REMINGTON PLACED ME IN DANGER. HE TRIED TO 
INTIMIDATE ME. 
WHEN I SHOWED NO SIGNS OF FEAR HE BEHAVED EVEN MORE RADICALLY. 
I DO BELIEVE, BEYOND A 
SHADOW OF A DOUBT THAT HE WOULD HAVE INJURED OR KILLED ME IF I 
WOULD HAVE DONE, SAID, OR 
THOUGHT ANYTHING THAT WOULD HAVE EVEN REMOTELY LICENSED HIM TO 
DO SO. HIS MANNER MADE 
IT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT NOT TO LICENSE HIM TO PERFORM NEGATIVE 
ACTIVITY DIRECTLY ON MY 
PERSON. I BELIEVE HE DID SO BECAUSE HIS SISTER POSSIBLY GOT 
INTO SOME KIND OF TROUBLE FOR 
EXTORTING MONEY FROM ME AND THEN CALLING THE POLICE AND CRYING 
"GUN" AND "RAPE" WHEN I 
WOULD GIVE HER NO MORE MONEY. 
MY PUBLIC DEFENDER DID NOT ADEQUATELY DEFEND ME. THE PEOPLE 
SELECTED FOR MY JURY 
IN JUDGE BRIANS' COURT WERE NOT MY PEERS. I RECOGNIZED TWO 
PEOPLE, FOR CERTAIN, AND 
THE OTHERS WERE FROM THE NEIGHBORHOOD JOHN THAXTON (JOHN 
REMINGTON) LIVED IN BRIGHAM 
CITY, UTAH. THE PEOPLE SELECTED FOR MY JURY IN JUDGE STIRBAS' 
COURT WERE NOT MY PEERS AS WELL. 
I RECOGNIZED SEVERAL OF THE PEOPLE FROM THE FIRST NEIGHBORHOOD 
I LIVED IN SALT LAKE CITY. 
I DON'T KNOW WHAT JOHN OR ANYONE ELSE TOLD OFFICER BEN JONES TO 
MAKE HIM SUBMIT 
A FALSE AND MISLEADING POLICE REPORT TO THE COUNTY BUT THAT IS 
WHAT HE SUBMITTED. HE 
ALSO DID NOT MAKE THE TRANSCRIPTIONS OF THE ORIGINAL 
QUESTIONING AVAILABLE TO MY ATTORNEY 
AND MYSELF BEFORE TRIAL AS PROMISED. 
I BELIEVE THAT THE PEOPLE IN BOTH JURIES WERE PREJUDICED 
AGAINST FINDING ME NOT GUILTY 
BEFORE I WAS HEARD. FURTHERMORE I BELIEVE MY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
WAS UNWILLING TO DEFEND ME TO 
THE BEST OF HIS ABILITY. FINALLY I WAS TRIED UNFAIRLY ON THE 
BASIS OF FALSE INFORMATION IN 
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FRONT OF PEOPLE WHO WERE NOT MY PEERS AND WRONGFULLY FOUND 
GUILTY. 
ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE SUBMITTED AN ERROR FULL AND MAJORITY 
NEGATIVE 
REPORT TO THE COURT WITHOUT GIVING MY ATTORNEY AND MY SELF A 
COPY BEFORE HAND. 
I DID NOT RAPE, HARM OR THREATEN TO KILL (WITH ANY MEANS) JOHN 
REMINGTONS' (JOHN 
THAXTON') SISTER TRACY. I GAVE HER THE BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT 
AND GAVE HER ONE HUNDRED 
AND FIFTY DOLLARS OF MONEY I HAD TO BORROW I DIDN'T HAVE OR 
FEEL LIKE I SHOULD 
HAVE HAD ANY MORE MONEY TO GIVE HER. 
I DID NOT OBTAIN OR EXERCISE CONTROL OVER ANOTHERS' PROPERTY 
WITH THE INTENT TO 
DEPRIVE HIM/HER THEREOF. 
FURTHER MORE I DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN OBTAINING OR EXERCISING 
CONTROL OVER 
ANOTHERS' PROPERTY WITH THE INTENT TO DEPRIVE HIM/HER THEREOF. 
FINALLY I DID BELIEVE THAT THE PROPERTY I FIRST WITNESSED BEING 
TAKEN WAS 
BY THE TRUE OWNER. ALSO I DID BELIEVE THAT CONSENT COULD BE 
GAINED TO TAKE 
THE PROPERTY THAT SECONDLY I WITNESSED BEING TAKEN. 
I WAS TAKEN FOR A RIDE. I WAS VIOLATED SEVERELY BY THE PERSON 
WHO TOOK ME. I WAS 
HARMED MENTALLY, EMOTIONALLY, AND PHYSICALLY BY THE VIOLATION. 
I DID NOT ASSIST OUT 
OF A LACK OF EARNEST BELIEF THAT THE PROPERTY WAS NOT BEING 
STOLEN. I DID NOT 
ASSIST BECAUSE I WAS RENDERED INCAPABLE TO ASSIST. 
I WAS AND AM STILL A VICTIM. THIS ENTIRE INCIDENT FROM START 
TO PRESENT HAS 
BEEN CRUEL AND INHUMANE TO ME. 
WHAT I HAVE WRITTEN IS THE TRUTH. WE ARE ALL FOOLS TO DENY THE 
TRUTH JUST 
TO HURT A GOOD PERSON, ME! I DID NOT KNOW HOW TO TELL SOMEONE I 
HAD JUST 
BEEN RAPED WHEN I WAS BROUGHT IN AND I'M STILL NOT SURE IF 
ANYONE WILL CARE. 
I'VE BEEN TREATED UNFAIRLY BY EVERYONE INVOLVED. 
SINCERELY, 
BRET CRIDDLE 
